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Chapter 1: Introduction
Operating systems combine building blocks like identification and authentication, access 
control and auditing to provide a coherent set of security controls. There is a general 
pattern to the way security controls are organized in existing operating systems. For 
example, both the information about users and the privileges granted to a user to access 
system resources can be stored in users account. Identification and authentication may 
verify a user’s identity, allowing a system to associate the user’s privileges with any 
process started by the user. Permissions on the resources can be set by the system 
manager or the owner of the resource. When deciding whether to grant or deny an access 
request, the operating system may refer to the user’s identity, the user’s privileges, and 
the permissions of the object. Similarly audit logs may be set up to detect and record the 
unauthorized actions of the users. But all these security features are not of much use till 
they are used properly. So the configuration of the operating system is an important issue. 
This thesis focuses on UNIX systems and specifically targets host-based vulnerabilities. 
Here the term “UNIX” symbolizes a group of operating systems from different 
manufacturers and does not represent a single operating system such as Linux, FreeBSD, 
NetBSD, and OpenBSD [18]. These operating systems tend to run on Intel-based 
hardware. And there are also commercial UNIX operating systems such as Sun 
Microsystems Solaris, Hewlett-Packard HP-UX, IBM AIX, and Silicon Graphic IRIX 
[18]. Each of these commercial operating systems will only run on their own company's 
hardware. Many features are common to all of these operating systems. Examples are the 
use of a bourne shell (the command programming language used to provide an interface 
to the UNIX operating system), the ps command (the process status command to know 
the id of a process), or the X Window System (the graphics system used on UNIX 
systems). There are of course differences between these operating systems. For example, 
comparing a list of the currently running daemons (the processes that run in the 
background and are not associated with any terminal) between any of the operating 
systems above will reveal many differences in the names and number of daemons [17]. 
Likewise when comparing vulnerabilities between UNIX systems, some vulnerabilities 
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are common to almost all UNIX systems and other vulnerabilities are unique to a 
particular UNIX system [17]. 
UNIX is a mutli-user, multi-tasking operating system. Multi-user means that the 
operating system allows different people to use the same host at the same time. Multi-
tasking means that each user can run many different programs simultaneously. One of the 
natural functions of such operating systems is to prevent different people (or programs) 
using the same computer from interfering with each other. As a result, some form of 
security is needed. UNIX has sophisticated security mechanisms that control the way 
users access files, modify system databases, and use system resources. Unfortunately 
such mechanisms can be misconfigured, are used carelessly, or contain buggy software. 
The majority of the vulnerabilities that have been found in UNIX over the years have 
resulted from these kinds of problems rather than from shortcomings in the intrinsic 
design of the security mechanisms. Particularly, the following parts of UNIX have been 
targeted: file systems, processes, network services, X Window System and password files 
[9]. Despite these problems, many UNIX manufacturers still believe that they can provide 
a reasonably secure UNIX operating system. Many issues appear when focusing on 
higher security. The biggest issue is due to the habits and expectations of the end users. 
Many users have grown to expect UNIX to be configured in a particular way. For 
example, at a university level, many users are used to making their files world-readable 
by default. Users are also often accustomed to being able to build and install their own 
software, often requiring system privileges to do so. Things may change drastically as a 
user moves from an academic environment at a university to the corporate world. The 
user may carry his/her past experiences to the new environment. These expectations and 
habits run contrary to good security practices in the business place. As a result the system 
administrator needs to make a timely check on the system for the vulnerabilities and take 
necessary action. The first objective of this thesis is to describe a new tool named Ferret, 
which will help system administrators and users to make a timely check of the system 
and look for the problems mentioned above. 
Before providing an overview of the thesis, we first review some concepts that we will be 
using in the thesis and that are taken from [1]. An attack is a malicious act that attempts 
to exploit a weakness in the system. Such a weakness is called a (security) vulnerability, 
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which is an accidental fault, or a malicious or non-malicious intentional fault. An 
intrusion results from an attack that has been (at least partially) successful. An attack is 
thus an intrusion attempt. An intrusion can thus be seen as the exploitation of a 
vulnerability. Vulnerabilities can be classified according to the location they are found. 
More specifically they can be found at the host or system level, network level and 
application level. About a decade ago the focus of security engineers shifted from host 
vulnerabilities to network level vulnerabilities. Security mechanisms like firewall 
implementations, encryption technologies are efficient in combating network level 
vulnerabilities. The popular doctrine was that if the perimeter or boundaries are secured 
then the home is safe. But despite all the perimeter defense security mechanisms, 
breaches have become more and more common and an estimated 70% of security 
breaches are committed from inside a network perimeter. Even if all the insiders are trust-
worthy, tools can be used to bypass most port blocking perimeter defense mechanisms 
such as firewalls [19]. To worsen the situation the increase in popularity of web services 
and Internet commerce has brought with it the usual tirade of prematurely released 
software littered with security holes. All these happenings and situations have again 
forced enterprises to reassess security from a host-based perspective. 
This thesis focuses on studying host vulnerabilities. In this thesis, host vulnerabilities are 
considered in a broad sense. Some might argue that some of the vulnerabilities are in fact 
configuration errors or that some of the vulnerabilities are features provided to the user. 
Despite such arguments we simply use the term vulnerability for anything identified as 
potentially exploitable by the attackers. 
There were two tools already existing that were used to check for host vulnerabilities. 
One of them COPS [6] was developed in 1993 by Daniel Farmer and Eugene H. 
Spafford. COPS [3] checks system configurations such as file and directory permissions. 
It also performs simple password checking. COPS relies on the fact that users and system 
administrators tend to be lazy about security [6]. Therefore, the assumption is that 
vulnerabilities in files, directories, and maybe passwords could be used to leverage access
to the user’s account. COPS’s main strong point is that it is very easy to use and is non-
intrusive (i.e., COPS does not alter files). Moreover, it reports all the problems to the 
auditor. 
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Another tool also developed about ten years ago was Tiger [16]. Tiger consists in a set of 
scripts that scan a UNIX system looking for security problems, in the same fashion as 
COPS. It scans system configuration files, file-systems, and user configuration files for 
possible security problems and reports them.
As said earlier these tools were developed about ten years ago and as a result have several 
limitations [7]. For example, they check for vulnerabilities that are no longer relevant, 
and offer no simple way to modify the list of checked vulnerabilities. Furthermore, they 
do not check for certain important current vulnerabilities. Moreover, their implementation 
is too customized to specific UNIX operating systems and versions. For example, they 
need to be modified in order to run on the current versions of Linux. Finally they were 
not designed using a modular approach (making updates to checked vulnerabilities 
difficult). For all the above reasons, we developed a new vulnerability checking tool 
called Ferret. The design and the implementation of Ferret are discussed in the first part 
of this thesis (Chapter 2). 
The second part of the thesis stresses on the data analysis of host vulnerabilities. The aim 
of the data analysis exercise is to understand the dynamics of the evolution of 
vulnerabilities on a system. Vulnerabilities on a system are bound to vary from one 
network to another, for one type of user population to another; or talking for the same 
network it may vary with time also. More specifically, some vulnerabilities exist for a 
long period of time, some impact more users and some are removed and then re-
introduced over time. Some depend on the proficiency level of the user population (e.g., 
users in a flexible university environment may not be compared to users on a system in 
some corporate office), frequency and usage of the system, feedback or action by system 
administrators, changes in the administrative policies, criticality of the network or the 
system, type of operating system, etc. For each of these factors a comprehensive research 
needs to be conducted first to obtain the metrics of the various factors affecting the 
growth of vulnerabilities and then to find the correlation between these factors and the 
evolution of vulnerabilities over time. Not all of these factors are independent. For 
example, user proficiency will increase upon feedback from the system administrator. 
Moreover some of these factors may either lead to proliferation of the vulnerability or 
may curb its growth. 
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The purpose of host-based vulnerability analysis can be as simple as knowing how many 
vulnerabilities of each type are present on a host. What types of vulnerabilities affect the 
highest number of users? Or finding out what vulnerabilities are predominantly common 
on most of the networks. Also it will be interesting to know what percentages of total 
users are afflicted by a particular vulnerability. For example, given ‘n’ users of a 
particular type of users’ community what percentages of users are expected to have weak 
passwords (a weak password is defined in Section 3.3.3)? A good statistical survey of the 
host vulnerabilities is needed for finding answers to these questions. This information 
captured at a particular instant of time represents a snapshot of the system and can 
provide interesting results for system administrators or users. This in turn can alert and 
help them in their endeavor to secure the system. But for broader understanding of the 
dynamics of the system, the evolution of vulnerabilities needs to be observed over a 
period of time. For example, exploitations related to the file .rhosts become possible 
when a user has his/her username in another user’s .rhosts file on the same system. As a 
result, the user can get access to the other user’s account without supplying a password. It 
may be interesting to determine the average duration of time before a user removes the 
entries from his/her .rhosts file. Another example is to determine how long a user keeps 
his/her home-directory world writable before properly configuring it. Also it will be 
interesting to know the average duration for which a user keeps his/her password weak 
before making it strong. 
Measures are introduced in Chapter 3 that help understanding the evolution of 
vulnerabilities. The majority of these measures are aimed to study the evolution of 
vulnerabilities and some of them are defined to observe the behavior of users also. 
Summing up, the process of learning the dynamic evolution of vulnerabilities for a 
system can be divided into three stages. In the first stage, the factors and security-related 
events for the system affecting the evolution of vulnerabilities need to be sorted out. The 
second step consists of obtaining the correlation between these factors, events and the 
various measures reflecting changes in the evolution of host vulnerabilities. This will
enable us to know for example, how many users are going to make their password strong 
on getting a feedback from a system administrator (an event). The final stage will be to 
get the average estimations for various measures for diverse environments by analyzing 
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the collected data. The data used for the analysis purpose should not only be collected for 
a longer period of time but also over diverse networks and environments. 
To estimate the measures and to study the evolution of vulnerabilities require real time 
data. The data are sensitive and such difficult to obtain them. Among the publicly and 
freely available data [2], there are many pitfalls. They are either very generic in nature 
(e.g., number of vulnerabilities per year) or only provide a snapshot of a system at a 
particular time but do not provide information about how vulnerabilities evolve over a 
period of time. Therefore, we have started the process of data collection on host 
vulnerabilities. 
The thesis is divided in two parts. 
a) The first part (Chapter 2) describes a new tool called Ferret developed specifically to 
help in identifying host-based vulnerabilities on UNIX systems and providing useful 
information to system administrators. Ferret has been described in [15]. The purpose of 
this tool can be extended to collect relevant data also to suit the second purpose of this 
thesis described below. 
b) The second part (Chapter 3) of the thesis starts with defining measures helpful to 
understand the evolution of vulnerabilities for a system over a period of time. The setup 
for automating the data analysis process for the output of Ferret is described. Also the 
introduced measures are estimated using two sets of experimental data sets. 
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Chapter 2: Ferret: A Host Vulnerability Checking Tool
2.1 Introduction
Since the creation of the UNIX operating system in 1969 it has evolved into the 
cornerstone of many of the mission-critical systems or Internet servers. UNIX has 
sophisticated security mechanisms that control the way users access files, modify system 
databases and use system resources. Unfortunately, those mechanisms become less 
efficient when the mechanisms are misconfigured or are used carelessly. This chapter 
outlines an attempt to identify the above listed issues through a scanning tool called 
Ferret, which is a host vulnerability checking tool and is publicly and freely available. 
2.2 Ferret Design Goals
In the introduction section the limitations associated with the already existing host 
vulnerability scanners (like Tiger [16] and COPS [6]) have been listed. The design goals 
of Ferret have been set up to address these limitations. Moreover, some of the design 
goals of Ferret are inspired by the design goals used for Nessus [12], a popular tool in its 
category of network vulnerability scanner. Nessus [12] is free, open-source, and based on 
plug-ins, and targets multiple operating systems. Ferret’s design goals are as follows. 
Since the field of computing security changes extremely rapidly, checking vulnerabilities 
requires a modular approach. To this end, the framework for Ferret is designed to use 
independent plug-in modules, or plug-ins. Each plug-in has a specific task vulnerability 
to scan for. This allows quick development and deployment of new vulnerability checks 
that do not require modification to the management portion (or core) of Ferret. So core of 
the tool is platform independent. In addition, plug-ins should be capable of interacting 
with a variety of other vulnerability checking tools, without affecting the core. 
The plug-ins are designed to be as specific to particular vulnerabilities as possible, 
allowing each vulnerability plug-in to check only a single vulnerability. The decision to 
use that approach, instead of larger multi-purpose plug-ins, made it possible to check new 
vulnerabilities without modifying the code for the old vulnerabilities. The keyword 
functionality described later can be used to group the specific vulnerabilities into larger 
groups of vulnerabilities. Much of the security field revolves around quick response to 
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new vulnerabilities and the sharing of those findings among the security community. To 
help with this need, Ferret has been designed as an open-source project, with the goal of 
creating a community of contributors that will help keep the available vulnerability plug-
ins current with security discoveries. This will facilitate the rapid development of new 
vulnerability-checking plug-ins when new vulnerabilities are found.
Scanning a large server with many files and users can be very time-intensive. Moreover 
large amounts of resources are needed if the number of vulnerabilities to check for is 
large. Ferret is designed to be fast and efficient. It chooses performance and simplicity 
over complex additional features. There are many different operating systems in use 
today. All of these different operating systems have some unique vulnerability and some 
vulnerability that they share with others. The core of the Ferret system is designed to be 
platform-independent, and as many of the vulnerability checking plug-ins as possible are 
also platform-independent. In some cases, the vulnerability checked is specific to one 
platform, and thus the associated plug-in needs to be platform dependent. For example, 
the format of some system file may be different for different UNIX environments. 
Moreover, the framework is set up in such a way as to allow the individual vulnerability 
checking plug-ins to specify which operating systems they are relevant for. As a result, 
each plug-in can figure out on which system they are applicable. A keyword-grouping 
functionality is designed into the management portion (or core) of Ferret. This serves the 
purpose of organizing and grouping of the numerous vulnerability plug-ins. Each plug-in 
will have a list of keywords associated with it that will allow relevant plug-ins to be 
selected without requiring all of them to be run.
The output format was designed to be modular. This facilitates the generation of relevant 
reports from the tool using output plug-ins. These output plug-ins in turn generate a 
report from Ferret’s raw data. This gives the flexibility in generating reports, which can 
range from raw text files to a centralized database using MySQL. Based on different 
requirements, plug-ins may have to collect different information about vulnerabilities. 
For each of the different customized requirements there should be a corresponding mode. 
Till now two modes have been implemented in Ferret. One mode indicates which 
vulnerabilities are present on the host. The second mode provides detailed information on 
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how the vulnerabilities found could be exploited and what privileges could possibly be 
gained on exploitation of those vulnerabilities. 
Ferret has been designed in a modular way where a different plug-in module is used for 
vulnerability that is checked.  The format of the output is also specified by different plug-
in modules. As a result, Ferret is extensible, and can easily be kept up-to-date through 
addition of checks for new vulnerabilities as they are discovered. The modular approach 
also makes it easy to provide specific configurations of Ferret tailored to specific 
operating systems or use environments. Ferret project is open source software 
implemented in Perl. This will facilitate the rapid development of new vulnerability-
checking plug-in modules when new vulnerabilities are found. The management 
component is designed to be platform independent, and as many of the vulnerability 
checking plug-ins modules also platform independent. In some cases, the vulnerability 
checked is specific to one platform, and thus the associated plug-in module needs to be 
platform-independent. In some cases, the vulnerability checked is specific to one 
platform, and thus the associated plug-in module needs to be platform-dependent. 
Keywords can group together different vulnerability checking plug-ins. The output plug-
in modules also provide flexibility by creating reports, including raw text files. The 
remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The detailed design, configuration, and 
implementation details of Ferret are described in the following sections. 
2.3 Ferret Detailed Design
The reasons for choosing an interpreted language like Perl for implementing Ferret are as 
follows. Ferret will need to process various text files and Perl is known for its text 
processing capabilities. Perl is also available on many popular platforms. The interpreted 
nature of the Perl promotes simplicity of use. There is no requirement for a compilation 
procedure which makes it possible to scan large systems within a reasonable time. Lastly 
Perl is a very powerful and expressive language (e.g., its high level data structures, like 
hash tables, are very helpful).
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2.3.1 Architecture Overview
The structure of Ferret can be divided into three parts as shown in Figure 2.1: 
Management (Ferret Core), the scanning agent (set of vulnerability-checking plug-ins, 
with individual plug-ins looking for specific vulnerabilities), and the collecting agent (set 
of output-plugins). 
The type of interface used between the Ferret core and the plug-ins is command-line 
arguments. Standard command-line options are used to pass the options between the core 
and the plug-ins. This approach was chosen over the use of the Perl packages/modules to 
give the option of each plug-in to be run as a stand-alone program. This element of 
design made debugging very easy. Also this way a system administrator can simply run a 
single Ferret plug-in without interacting with the rest of the tool at all. 
                                 Figure 2.1: Architecture Overview of Ferret
           Scanner 
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    System
Information




The core program of the Ferret tool is designed to be independent and simple. The 
following section details the different steps executed by the Ferret core.
1. It interprets the command line options and reads the configuration file.
2. It determines the information about the system Ferret is running on, such as the 
operating system name and version. This information is helpful in later stages in 
filtering out the plug-ins that should remain active for a particular host. For 
example, a plug-in developed specifically for the Linux system should not be 
executed on a Solaris host.
3. It determines what plug-ins are available in the system from the directory defined 
in the configuration file (or the command line).
4. It queries each plug-in for information about what vulnerability it checks, what 
level of privileges this vulnerability could gain, on which operating system this 
vulnerability should be checked for, and what keywords are applicable to this 
plug-in. This information is stored in a hash table for easy reference later. 
5. It builds a hash table of the keywords, based on the individual keywords, in order 
to simplify the running of the plug-ins. 
6. It uses the keywords to determine which plug-ins to run. If no keyword is 
provided, then a default keyword of all is used to run all the plug-ins.
7. It runs all the chosen plug-ins in sequence.
8. It divides the plug-ins, based on the results obtained, into two categories: those 
that have found vulnerabilities, and those that have not.
9. It pipes out the results, based on the mode selected by the user, through the 
corresponding output plug-ins in the desired format.
The source code of the Ferret core is given in the Appendix A.1. 
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2.4 Vulnerability –Checking Plug-ins
2.4.1 Options for Running the Vulnerability-Checking Plug-ins
The goal of vulnerability checking plug-in is to scan the system for a particular 
vulnerability. The Ferret core can make the plug-ins do diverse functions using the 
command line options. For example, when Ferret is executed with the –info option, each 
plug-in returns information including its version number, a list of keywords associated 
with the plug-in, the list of the operating systems on which the plug-in can be run, and a 
short description of the vulnerability the plug-in checks.
It is also possible for vulnerability checking plug-ins to interact with other tools. In fact 
Ferret plug-ins can act as a wrapper to other tools. Plug-ins written for these purposes 
pass the obtained results to the Ferret core. Ferret core on obtaining the results passes it 
over to the output plug-ins. For example, a plug-in has been written to instrument the 
commonly used password-cracker tool, John the Ripper [10].  This plug-in runs this tool 
for a specified time. This way it becomes very easy to find categories of weak passwords 
(defined in Section 3.3.3) on a system. Moreover the interaction with Ferret also provides 
how privileges can be escalated using the weak password vulnerability. 
Sometimes a system administrator may want to execute only a specific subset of the plug-
ins. So depending on their needs, they can enable or disable the execution of plug-ins. For 
example, plug-ins checking SUID files may take a lot of time because they need to search 
through the file system. So a system administrator running short of time can easily switch 
off those plug-ins. 
2.4.2 Groups of Vulnerability-Checking Plug-ins
Based on the type of vulnerability a plug-in checks for, plug-ins have been divided into 
various groups. Till now ten groups of vulnerability checking plug-ins have been 
implemented. These ten groups of vulnerability checking plug-ins have been chosen 
based on the fact that they cover the most commonly found host vulnerabilities [8]. 
Vulnerabilities belonging to a particular group have similar characteristics. Currently, 
seventy four plug-ins have been implemented and released on the website [7] for public 
use. The release of Ferret as a freely available open source program should encourage the 
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security community to develop plug-ins and thus rapidly increase the number of available 
plug-ins. 
The first group of plug-ins checks whether or not certain critical system files or 
directories (e.g., /bin, /.cshrc, /dev, /etc/group, /etc/passwd, /etc, /.login, /.profile, /.rhosts, 
/usr/etc) are owned by root. These files are generally run by root, and thus should be 
owned by root. If any ownership has been changed deliberately, then the system 
administrator is made aware of the change, as the aim of the Ferret is just to report a 
potential vulnerability and not to correct it.
The second group of plug-ins checks if the permissions of critical system directories (e.g., 
/, /bin, /usr/adm, /etc, /dev) are world-writable. Having any of these directories world-
writable makes it easy for intruders to gain root privilege. For example, the directory /etc 
contains information about groups, users, and passwords. An attacker could put some 
commands in /etc/rc*, /etc/init.d/*, and other files in the /etc directory to create a back 
door into the system each time the system is rebooted. Therefore, all the files in the /etc 
directory should be kept non-writable by any user other than root. Similarly, the /bin 
directory stores shells for the system. An attacker can possibly put a Trojan Horse in any 
of the files to become root. It is therefore important to safeguard these critical directories. 
However, for specific files within the directory, Ferret leaves it up to the system 
administrator to decide what exactly the permission set should be. For example, although 
the majority of the devices listed in the /dev directory should be non-readable and non-
writable, some of the files, such as /dev/null, /dev/tty and, /dev/console need to be world-
writable.
The third group of plug-ins checks the paths and filenames inside the root start-up files 
(e.g., /.login, /.cshrc, /.profile) for world-writability.  Also, the path variable in those 
startup files is checked to ensure that a “.” is not in the path variable. An attacker could 
place a Trojan Horse in various directories with the hope that someone with “.” in his or 
her path will execute the program.
The fourth group of plug-ins checks the umask settings in login initialization files (e.g., 
/.login, /.cshrc, /.profile, /etc/profile). The umask is a four-digit octal number that UNIX 
uses to determine the file permissions for newly created files. Umask settings often have 
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a default value of 022 to make it easier for users to share files with other users. 
Unfortunately, a user may inadvertently set the umask to be world-readable while 
creating a new file, which would allow anyone to read the files.
The fifth group of plug-ins focuses on configuration issues for certain files of each user’s 
home directory. More specifically, these plug-ins check whether permissions on certain 
important files (e.g., .Xdefaults, .Xresources, .bashrc, .cshrc, .defaults, .emacs, .emacsrc, 
.forward, .fvcmd, .kshrc, .login, .logout, .netrc, .profile, .rhosts, .screenrc, .tcshrc, .xinitrc) 
of any user’s home directory are set to group- or world-writable. This group of plug-ins 
can avoid many situations in which a user can snatch another user's rights easily, even by 
placing a simple Trojan Horse. For example, the .login and .profile files are executed 
each time a user logs in. Commands within these files are executed by the user’s shell. 
Even making such files group-writable makes them susceptible to potential attackers 
writing commands that are executable each time the user logs in. However, to 
accommodate special situations in which rights or permissions have been deliberately 
given, the discretion of the system administrator and the user of the home directory are 
final.
In UNIX systems, the SUID bit allows a file to being run as the user that owns the file, 
even if it is run by someone other than that user. A SUID file that is writable can easily 
be used to compromise the user account of the owner, including the case when the owner 
is root. While certain files on any system need to be SUID root, it is critical that those 
files not be writable by anyone other than root. The sixth group of plug-ins is designed to 
search for all the files on the target system that have the SUID bit enabled. Plug-ins of 
this type find all the SUID programs on a system and check to see if they have group-
writable permissions or world-writable permissions, or if they are owned by the user root 
(UID 0).
The seventh group of plug-ins focuses on the different fields of the password file. The 
structure of the password file is similar for all UNIX systems. However, certain fields 
may take different formats. For example, the password field may contain an asterisk (*), 
an exclamation (!), or encrypted password characters. Different types of vulnerabilities, 
like a blank password field, non-root accounts with UID set to zero, or an invalid home 
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directory, can cause a security flaw in the system. For example, if the password field is 
blank then the particular user account does not need a password to log in. Depending on 
the operating system and and its version, the encrypted password is stored in a ghost file, 
like the /etc/security/passwd or /etc/shadow file. A ghost file like /etc/shadow gives the 
encrypted password a more secure structure, and such files are not readable by ordinary 
users.
The eighth group of plug-ins focuses on system file permissions. Some of the plug-ins 
developed in this family target the /etc/exports file, and others target the /etc/fstab file. 
More specifically, some plug-ins check whether or not files exported in /etc/exports have 
been given explicit access control. They also check whether there is any use of wildcards, 
or if any write access for root has been given. Note that wherever possible files, should be 
mounted as read-only. Other plug-ins check whether the resources that are mounted in the 
file /etc/fstab are not set as world- or group- writable. The /etc/fstab or /etc/vfstab (for 
Solaris) file makes it possible to automate the mounting of certain file systems, especially 
at system start-up. It contains a series of lines describing the filesystems, their mount 
points, and other options. Several plug-ins check whether the resources mounted in the 
/etc/fstab or /etc/vfstab (for Solaris) file are not set as world- or group- writable.
The ninth group of plug-ins checks the .rhosts file to see if any unreasonable permission 
is given to remote users and hosts. The .rhosts file resides in the user's home directory. 
The file defines which remote hosts can invoke certain commands on the local host 
without supplying any password. If the .rhosts file is writable by others, then any host 
included in the file can get access to run commands on the system without supplying a 
password. Also, if a user has his/her username in another user’s .rhosts file on the same 
system, then the user can get access to the other user’s account without supplying a 
password. Thus it becomes important to check both the content of the .rhosts file and the 
permission of the file.
Lastly the tenth group consists of two plug-ins. This group plug-ins checks if any user has 
set the permission on its home-directory as group or world writable. 
The source code for some of the plug-ins has been attached in Appendix A.2.
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2.5 Output Plug-ins
As mentioned before, the Ferret core can be run in different modes. For each of the 
modes, the Ferret core generates a raw format output file using the output from different 
vulnerability checking-plug-ins. Each mode can have a number of different formats in 
which to present the final output results generated by that mode. For example, a user 
could generate a report in XML format by defining it attributes in an XML output plug-
in. As mentioned earlier, two modes have been implemented. The first mode has been 
designed to focus specifically on information on vulnerabilities. The second mode has 
been designed to provide some more detailed information on the vulnerabilities found 
and their possible exploitations for the purpose of quantifying the security. The source 
code for the output plug-in developed for the ASCII format has been given in the 
Appendix A.3. 
2.5.1 Output Plug-in with the First Mode
The raw format output file created by Ferret core for this mode consists of four fields. 
The first field contains the name of the plug-in. The second field contains a short 
description of what the plug-in does. The third field indicates the result of the scan by the 
plug-in. It specifies whether vulnerability was found. The last field provides some more 
information relevant to the vulnerability found by the plug-in. For example, if a plug-in 
finds that the home directory in a password file is group-writable, then the output field 
will list the exact home directory that is group writable. This mode is useful to the system 
administrator for determining various vulnerabilities present in the system, including 
those in users’ home directories. Based on the obtained results, an organizational security 
policy can be framed out, and users’ negligence can be effectively checked.
2.5.2 Output Plug-in with the Second Mode
The raw format output file created by the Ferret core for this output plug-in consists of 
the list of all the users (along with their groups) present in the home directory of the host 
on which Ferret is running, plus four additional fields. The first field contains the name of 
the plug-in. The second field contains the information about any possible change in the 
privilege associated with the vulnerability. The third field provides the name of the file or 
directory that is vulnerable. The last field gives a brief description of the vulnerability. 
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The information provided by this output plug-in on the vulnerability and its exploitation 
can be used to evaluate the security of a computing system through the use of privilege 
graphs [4]. M. Dacier, Y. Deswarte, M. Kanniche have presented a method for evaluating 
the security of operational systems by building a privilege graph [5]. In a privilege graph 
[4], each node represents a set of privileges assigned to a user or set of users (e.g., a 
UNIX group). Any arc that connects two nodes is representative of a vulnerability, which 
allows a user (starting node) to achieve another user’s privilege (ending node). The 
output file provided by Ferret contains all the different elements for building a privilege 
graph. The list of all the users, along with their groups contained in the output file, 
defines the set of nodes. The set also include two special nodes that represent a user with 
no privilege (an outsider) and a user who has administrative privileges. A transition 
between two nodes is associated with each vulnerability. The obtained output file 
contains the list of the vulnerabilities found on a host, and thus contains the list of 
transitions between two nodes in the privilege graph. The output plug-in with the second 
mode thus contains the textual description of a privilege graph. 
2.6 Comments on the Ferret Code
The source code of Ferret given in Appendix A is well documented. But to further ease 
the understanding of the code more details are needed on some critical parts and are 
discussed here. As can be seen in Figure 2.1 the Ferret core interacts with the 
vulnerability checking plug-ins. More specifically, it interacts with them two times. The 
first time the core interacts with the plug-ins, it collects various information from each of 
the plug-in like the version number, the keywords that can be used for the plug-in, the 
operating systems for which it is meant for, the short and the long description of the plug-
in and the privilege gain possible on exploiting the vulnerability. The core then stores this 
information in a hash table and uses it to determine which plug-ins shall be run. The 
Ferret core then performs various tests like checking the type and version of the operating 
system of the host. Only the plug-ins meant for that host operating system are run. The 
second time the core interacts with the vulnerability checking plug-ins it actually runs the 
plug-ins. As already mentioned, the Ferret core can be run in two modes. The 
vulnerability checking plug-ins collect information for both the modes irrespective of the 
mode in which the core is called. Then the information is passed over to the Ferret core, 
18
which decides on the information to be sent over to the output plug-in based on the 
selected mode. This design decision was made to standardize the design of the 
vulnerability checking plug-ins. 
All the different types of results generated by the vulnerability checking plug-ins are 
flushed to a single array (called “output”) and the distinction is made by the Ferret core 
using the keyword introduced at the beginning of a result. As an example, the plug-in 
bin-root-ownership given in Appendix A.2 is being discussed below. 
The lines taken from the plug-in bin-root-ownership (the full code of the plug-in is given 
in Appendix A.2) show the different types of results pushed to the same array “output”. 
The keywords used help the Ferret core to distinguish the type of the result. For example, 
the keyword “NOT_EXIST” used below will help the core understand that the file or 
directory for which the plug-in was built to check the vulnerability for does not exist on 
that host. Similarly the keyword “RESULT” helps the core to determine if a vulnerability 
is found or not. And the keyword “PRIV” makes the core know the output of the plug-ins 
contains the change in the privilege. 
push @output,"NOT_EXIST Directory /bin does not exist\n"; 
push @output,"RESULT No Vulnerability Found\n";
print @output;
die "Directory /bin does not exist\n";
push @output,"VUL None\n";
if ($vulnerability_found == 1)
{




   push @output,"RESULT No Vulnerability Found\n";
} 
push @output,"PRIV No privilege change,/bin,not owned by root\n";
print @output;
The plug-ins can be run as standalone programs also. This helps in testing as each plug-in 
can be tested alone before interacting with the main core. The location of Perl on the 
hosts on which Ferret will be run can be changed. The first few lines at the beginning of 
each file in Ferret are included to find the location of Perl. 
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2.7 Conclusion
Ferret has been developed with the idea of providing the security community with a 
useful and efficient tool for checking host vulnerabilities. It is a freely available open 
source tool developed in Perl. The tool along with the “ReadMe” file and instructions can 
be downloaded from the website: http://ferret.crhc.uiuc.edu. Presently 74 plug-ins have 
been implemented. As said earlier, each plug-in checks for a specific vulnerability. 
Moreover, the output of Ferret is also provided through the use of plug-ins. Plug-ins 
developed till now mainly target Linux, Solaris, and HP-UX requirements. The security 
community is expected to participate in developing new plug-ins for multiple operating 
systems. System administrators could then select subsets of plug-in to check for 
vulnerabilities customized to their computer networks. Moreover, even though the 
vulnerabilities currently addressed focus on UNIX platforms, the development of Ferret 
in Perl facilitates the introduction of plug-ins targeting vulnerabilities in Windows. 
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Chapter 3: VULNERABILITY DATA ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 the importance of having various measures to study the evolution of 
vulnerabilities was highlighted. This chapter first introduces various measures. These 
measures are then estimated using data from two data collections. The first one was 
conducted at LAAS-CNRS over period of 21 months. The second one was obtained by 
running Ferret at UIUC for 9 months. Finally the results of two data collections are 
compared.
These measures will help understanding the evolution of vulnerabilities on a particular 
host over a period of time. As these measures are defined for a particular vulnerability on 
a system and a particular environment they are helpful in understanding the dynamics of 
the system under observation. The following types of questions can be answered. What is 
the expected percentage of users who have assigned incorrect permissions for various 
critical files (like .login, .cshrc) in their home-directories? How many users in the 
population for a given environment are expected to have weak passwords (defined in 
Section 3.3.3)? What is the expected duration for which a user keeps his/her password 
strong? Some measures can concentrate on the rate with which instances of a 
vulnerability in a particular network are introduced or removed. For example, what is the 
rate of introduction of weak passwords in a system? What is the rate of removal of weak 
passwords in a system? What is the average duration for which vulnerabilities stay in the 
system (e.g., average length for which the user keeps his/her home-directories world or 
group writable)? These types of estimations will help us to understand the dynamic 
evolution of vulnerabilities over a period of time. But it may not be easy to compare two 
systems based on the relative values of these measures as described afterwards when 
defining the measures. 
Some of the vulnerabilities on a host (for a particular file system) can have only a single 
instance. For example, the ‘/bin’ directory for a file system is unique so the vulnerability 
arising if the directory ‘/bin’ is not owned by the root will also be unique. But some of 
the vulnerabilities may have multiple instances. For example, many users can 
simultaneously have weak passwords or may assign incorrect permission to files in their 
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home-directories. Each of these instances are counted as a vulnerability. As a result, some 
measures defined in this chapter might not be relevant for vulnerabilities having a single 
instance on a host. The measure rate of growth of instances of vulnerabilities on a host 
can be defined only for vulnerabilities having more than one instance. On the other hand, 
measures estimating the average duration for which a particular vulnerability is present 
can be useful for single and multiple instances. 
For data analysis purpose the host vulnerabilities can be clubbed together in various 
groups based on some similarities, as shown in Table 3.1. It is much easier to study a 
group of similar vulnerabilities. It not only makes the study less cumbersome but it may 
be easier to observe any trend if studied collectively in a group. For example, all the 
configuration issues in /etc/passwd files like blank password field or a blank line can be 
clubbed together as a group of vulnerabilities for study purposes. 
3.2 Definition of Measures 
This section defines the various measures introduced to study the evolution of 
vulnerabilities. The measures can be divided into four categories.The first category of the 
measures described in the next paragragh captures the information related to the total 
number of instances of a vulnerability and the total number of users present on the 
system. 
a) Tv(t): This measure gives the total instances of a vulnerability v, exhibited on the 
system under consideration. As discussed earlier, for some vulnerabilities only a single 
instance is possible. This measure is not relevant for these vulnerabilities. The governing 
factors influencing the evolution of vulnerabilities on a system cause the estimation for 
this measure to vary with time. Though details on the attacks and the system is required 
before operational security of a system can be calculated this parameter is a reflection of 
the hidden potential danger a system carries with it. As a result, two different networks 
cannot be compared just on the basis of value of this measure. For example, it is not 
possible to say which network is more secure if one network has more instances of 
vulnerabilities than another. Tv(t)  is a primitive measure.
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b) Up(t): Users on a system change continuously. More users may be added to a system, 
while some users may leave. This measure represents the total number of users on the 
system under consideration at time t. This measure is a primitive measure. 
c) Tv(t)/Up(t): The measure Tv (t) may simply be affected by the changing number of 
users. To mitigate that effect this measure has been defined as the ratio of total number of 
instances of vulnerability v to the total number of users on the system. This in effect 
normalizes the measure Tv(t) with respect to the number of users on the system. This 
measure will be more useful to look at when the numbers of vulnerabilities are a direct 
function of number of users of the system. For example, how many users have kept their 
home directories group or world writeable definitely will be influenced by the number of 
users on the system. Here it should be pointed again that vulnerabilities having single 
instances may not be dependent on the number of users. Like whether /bin is owned by 
root or not is not dependent on the number of users on the system. Therefore this measure 
is not relevant in case of vulnerabilities having a single instance. This is a derived 
measure from Tv(t) and Up(t).
The next category consists of three measures and captures the rate of introduction of new 
instances of a vulnerability in the system.
d) Nv(t): On account of various reasons like a user granting permissions to everyone for 
his/her home directory, changing habits of user population or by just addition of new 
users on the system more vulnerability instances are added to a system with time. This 
measure indicates how many new instances of vulnerability v have been added in a 
system at any point of time. The advantage of this measure is that when plotted against 
time, a sharp rise on a particular day can be observed easily. And reasons or factors 
responsible for this sudden jump can be traced out. Nv(t) is a primitive measure.
e) Nv,i(t): Sometimes the fluctuations in the day to day (discrete) readings for the measure 
Nv(t) are so high that it may not be possible to evaluate the trend of the growth of 
vulnerability. So it makes more sense to evaluate the change in number of instances of 
the vulnerability v after every fixed period of time rather than looking at discrete values 
(like for every day). This measure observes the growth of vulnerability after every fixed 
interval of time. It can be given as Nv(t) – Nv(t-i) where “i” is any constant time interval 
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chosen. Since this measure can be obtained from the measure Nv(t) it is a derived 
measure.
f) Ncv(t): This measure counts the new instances of a vulnerability v from the time of 





 0 . The slopes 
for these curves over a time period give an average estimation for the measure Nv(t) and 
are very handy. Since this measure can be obtained from the measure Nv(t)  it is a derived 
measure.
The third category consists of three measures and captures the rate of removal of a 
vulnerability from the system. 
g) Rv(t): This measure is the counterpart to the measure Nv(t) and indicates how many 
instances of vulnerability v are removed in a system at any point of time. On account of 
various factors instances of vulnerabilities are also continuously removed from a system. 
This can happen on the account of an action by a system administrator or the increase in 
user’s awareness regarding the vulnerability. Rv(t) is a primitive measure. 
h) Rv,i(t): On the same reasoning as given for the measure Nv,i(t), the measure Rv,i(t) has 
been defined and is the counterpart to Nv,i(t). This measure computes how many instances 
of vulnerability v have been removed from the system after every fixed interval of time. 
This measure can be given as Rv(t) – Rv(t-i) where “i” is any constant time interval 
chosen. Since this measure can be obtained from the measure Rv(t) it is a derived 
measure.
i) Rcv(t): This measure is the counterpart for the measure Ncv(t) and counts the removed 






 0 . The slopes for these curves over a time period give an average estimation 
for the measure Rv(t). Since this measure can be obtained from the measure Rv(t) it is a 
derived measure.
The last category consist of two measures and capture the cahractersitics of the user 
population. 
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j) Als,v : This measure is defined to capture the behavior of the users of the system. It 
estimates the average duration of time for which a vulnerability v was present for a user 
over the period of data collection. It represents an average value computed over all the 
users. Als,v is a primitive measure. 
k) Ls,v: This measure is also defined to help understand the behavior of the users of the 
system. Sometimes the user can make the system assailable with the same vulnerability 
intermittently in a cyclic way. So this measure represents the average time period for 
which the user has kept the system continuously vulnerable with a particular 
vulnerability. The best example can be how a user chooses a password. Sometimes a user 
can be careful and chooses a strong password but sometimes he/she can choose a weak 
password also. So this measure estimates the average time interval for which the user 
keeps his/her password weak before choosing a strong password. This measure depends 
largely on the user habits, system administrator feedbacks, etc. Ls,v is a primitive 
measure. 
While the first eight measures (except Up(t)) are defined to study how vulnerabilities 
manifest themselves in the system over a period of time the last two measures along with 
the measure Up(t) concentrate on studying the characteristics of the user population. The 
average estimation for the measure Als,v for any two users in the population may be the 
same for a vulnerability v, but by looking at the estimation for the measure Ls,v, 
something more can be learned. For example, there may be a case when the estimation 
for measure Ls,v for the weak password vulnerability is smaller for one user than the other 
though the estimate for the measure Als,v  is the same. So, it can be said that this might 
reflect the careless attitude but on the other hand a user with larger length of sequence 
may reflect his/her ignorance about that vulnerability being present. After defining the 
measures the next step was to obtain the estimates for these measures using the two data 
collections one conducted at LAAS-CNRS without using Ferret and the other one 

























3.3 Data Analysis: LAAS-CNRS
3.3.1 Introduction
The data was collected at LAAS-CNRS using scripts wrapping the scanning tool COPS 
[3] and the password cracker tool, Cracker Version 5.5 [11] on a large distributed 
computer system. This system consisted of more than a hundred different workstations 
connected to a local area network. On an average there were 770 users during the period 
of study sharing one global file system. The number of users varied from 692 to around 
850. The system was observed during 21 months starting from June 1995 till March 
1997. The time intervals in between subsequent observations were not constant as shown 
in Figure 3.1. 
                                            Figure 3.1: Time Intervals between Subsequent Readings 
The total numbers of users on the system were continuously changing as can be seen in 
Figure 3.2. Throughout the period of data collection on the one hand new users kept 
being added to the system (Figure 3.3) and on the other hand existing users kept on 
leaving (Figure 3.4). This was primarily due to arrival and departure of temporary staff 
[13]. The archive of the data contains 385 items (one for each day). Security was not the 
main concern on this target system for the users. There was no strong global security 
policy. The number of system administrators also kept on varying from three to six 
during the period of data collection. The responsibility of the system administrator ranged 
from every day tasks like creating an account for a user, taking back-ups to specific tasks 
like analyzing any intrusion activity. The results of this data collection were not given to 














































based on their own network analysis. The final data presented to us was sanitized and did 
not represent the real users and the groups.
   
                           
             Figure 3.2: Total Number of Users as a Function of Time     
   
                                     Figure 3.3a: New Users added to the System



















                    
 Figure 3.4: Users removed from the System 
The data consisted of two types of information. The first type of information provided the 
users on the host along with the corresponding groups they belonged to. The second 
presented the vulnerabilities present and the users affected by it. After a preliminary 
examination of the data 31 distinct vulnerabilities were found. These vulnerabilities are 
listed in Table 3.1. For analysis purpose they were divided into thirteen groups. These 
groups were formed as to club together the similar type of vulnerabilities into one group. 
For example, Trojan horses can be put if either of the configuration files .login, .emacs or 
.profile are world or group writable. So all these vulnerabilities where a Trojan horse can 
be inserted on account of improper permission settings were put into one group. Those 
vulnerabilities, which could not be put in any group, were kept in a general category and 
were studied independently. For example, weak passwords could not be grouped with any 
other vulnerability so it was studied in isolation. Note that this classification is broad in 
nature. For example, all the exploits using paths were classified under “path” type 
vulnerability.
Out of 389 files in the archive, ten files were not used for analysis purpose on account of 
the following reasons:
28
a) The files contained only one or two vulnerabilities. So it was doubtful whether all the 
scans had been performed.
b) If there was a huge sudden change in number of vulnerabilities from the preceding and 
the succeeding recordings.
Type of Vulnerability Exploitation possible Group of 
vulnerability 
A1) .login world writable Trojan Horse A
A2 ) .emacs group writable Trojan Horse A
A3) .logout group writable Trojan Horse A
A4) .tcshrc group writable Trojan Horse A
A5) .netrc group writable Trojan Horse A
A6) .xinitrc group writable Trojan Horse A
A7) .Xdefaults group writable Trojan Horse A
A8) .Xresources group writable Trojan Horse A
A9) .cshrc group writable Trojan Horse A
A10) .screenrc world writable Trojan Horse A
A11) .defaults world writable Trojan Horse A
A12) .fvcmd world writable Trojan Horse A
B) Password Weak  Password weak B
C) .rhosts group writable Group members can write 
in file .rhosts of the user
C
D) .mailrc group writable Group members can  make 
an indirect attack by 
.mailrc 
D
E) .forward group writable G makes a direct attack by 
.forward
E
F) home directory group or world writable Group members or world 
can  write in user home 
directory
F
G) User U1 in .rhosts of user U2 U1 in .rhosts of user U2 G
H1) path: /home/U/ used by User U is world writable path / H
H2) path: /usr/local/imsl/imsl.idf used by User U is world writable path / H
H3 ) path: /usr/local/artist/Artitist2.4/bin used by User U is world writable C. path / H
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H4)  path: /usr/local/artist/Artitist2.4/usrcds used by User U is world 
writable 
C. path / H
H5) path: /usr/local/Divers/bin/sun4 used by User U2 is writable by User U1 C. path / H
H6) path: /usr/local/tex/bin/sun4 used by User U2 is writable by User U1 C. path / H
H7) path: /bin used by User U {in pos. 4, 7} is world writable C. path / H
H8) path: /usr/local/bin used by User U {in pos. 6, 4, 10} is world writable C. path / H
H9) path: /usr/local/matlab/bin used by User U is world writable C. path / H
I1) system directory: /usr/local/bin is world writable . system file I
I2) system directory: /bin is world writable . system file I
I3) system file: /usr/local/bin/xxx used by root is writable by User U1 . system file I
I4) system file:  /etc/yyy is group writable . system file I
Table 3.1: Types of Vulnerabilities and their Groups 
Assumptions
The assumptions made for the analysis purpose are listed as below.
a) As already mentioned, the data was not collected every day. The time intervals in 
between the subsequent readings are shown in Figure 3.1. For the analysis purpose, it has 
been assumed that the status of vulnerability (i.e. if it is present or absent) remains the 
same till the next recording. 
b) The user population (though changing throughout the period of data collection) was 
more or less homogenous so results are not biased. This assumption can impact the 
estimation for measures for vulnerabilities like weak passwords. It may be expected that 
the users who were present throughout the period of data collection might have a better 
understanding of keeping their passwords strong. This might be on account of feedbacks 
received by system administrators or due to their own experiences of keeping a weak 
password.
c) The ten files, which have been deleted as discussed before, do not significantly affect 
the results. 
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Limitations of the Study
a) As already mentioned the LAAS-CNRS data was collected more then 7 years ago. So 
the estimation they provide for the measures may not reflect today’s scenario. 
b) The system administrators’ policies are also not known in details. It is not known what 
inputs were given to the users and how forceful they were. Because of these limitations in 
the data analysis, trends can be observed but they can’t be pin-pointed to a particular 
factor.
3.3.2 Working Methodology 
The procedure is being outlined here in form of various steps. The first step was done for 
every group (Table 3.1) of vulnerability but the other steps were repeated for only five 
groups for reasons discussed afterwards. 
1) First a generic trend of the behavior of the total instances of the vulnerabilities with 
time (Tv(t)) was obtained for each group of vulnerability. Sometimes to obtain more 
specific information analysis was then narrowed down to an individual vulnerability in 
the group. This was done particularly to see what vulnerabilities in the group have a 
dominant influence on measure Tv(t) and to see if the behavior of the individual 
vulnerabilities of the group is the same with the group as a whole. 
2) To make the obtained trends not biased on the number of users’ plots of measure 
Tv(t)/Up(t) were obtained. The plots obtained in step 1 and step 2 together with users’ 
curves (Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4) were compared to see how changing user population 
influences the behavior of the total number of instances of the vulnerability.
3) To study the jumps in the above two plots obtained, measure Nv(t) plotted against time 
was obtained and reasons to explain these sudden jumps were sought out. 
4) The plots for measure Nv,i(t) are then obtained. Different time intervals were 
empirically tried out to choose the best interval, “i” which helps to understand any trend 
in new instances for the vulnerability. 
5) The plots of Ncv(t) were obtained against time. The slopes for these curves over a time 
period give an average estimation for measure Nv(t). 
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6) The plots of Rv(t) over the period of data collection were obtained. The jumps are 
studied and the corresponding reasons were sought out.
7) The plots for measure Rv,i(t) are then obtained. Different time intervals were 
empirically tried out to choose the best interval “i” to show the trend in the data. 
8) The plots of Rcv(t) were obtained against time. The slopes for these curves over a time 
period give an average estimation for measure Rv(t). 
9) Finally curves showing the net rate of change in the instances for the vulnerability 
were obtained. The net rate can be given as (Nv(t)-Rv(t)). This rate is an approximation to 
the first derivative of the function Tv(t). Similarly curves were obtained for (Nv,i(t)-Rv,i(t)) 
and (Ncv(t)-Rcv(t)) and plotted against time. Sometimes the rate of introduction of new 
instances Nv(t) and rate of removal of instances Rv(t) cancel each other for long time 
periods. This makes the measure Tv(t) constant with time and makes the system appear 
static. But the reality may be that instances of vulnerabilities are both added and removed 
continuously from the system. 
10) Finally estimations for the two measures Als,v and Ls,v were computed. 
3.3.3 Results and Observations
Out of the nine groups shown in Table 3.1, only five groups (i.e. groups A, B, D, F and 
G) were studied in detail after step one of the working methodology. Basically step one 
along with some preliminary examination of the data helped in reaching this conclusion. 
The prime reason for dropping the other groups and focusing on only five groups was 
that the instances of the vulnerabilities for the dropped groups were very small and 
insignificant compared to the chosen five groups. Besides this the count of their instances 
over a period of time was constant.
Table 3.2 lists the groups that were studied comprehensively along with the 
corresponding estimation of the measure Als,v and Ls,v calculated for the users. 
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     Table 3.2: Estimations for the Measures Als,v and Ls,v
Results for Group A
The results presented in this section focus on vulnerabilities in configuration files. The 
vulnerabilities are due to incorrectly assigned permission on these files. As a result, the 
vulnerabilities can be exploited by inserting a Trojan horse in the configuration files. 
Table 3.1 shows a total of twelve vulnerabilities found due to improperly assigned 
permission settings on the following twelve files: .login, .emacs, .logout, .tcshrc, .netrc, 
.xinitrc, .Xdefaults, .Xresources, .cshrc, .screenrc, .defaults and .fvcmd. 
As can be seen in Table 3.1, Group A consisted of a total of twelve types of 
vulnerabilities. First a plot for measure Tv(t) against the number of days for the whole 
group was obtained (Figure 3.5). Three distinct regions can be seen in the graph based on 
the value for this measure. In the first region ranging till 138th day, the value for measure 
Tv(t) varied from 232 to 281 and increased steadily. As can be seen there is a sudden 
jump on day 138 for measure Nv(t) (Appendix B.1). This observation cannot be explained 
based on the information we have. Also the sudden dip on day 166 and rise on day 169 


































               Figure 3.5: Tv(t) for Group A                                  
               Figure 3.6: Tv(t)/Up(t) for Group A 
The plot for measure Tv(t)/Up(t) (Figure 3.6) also showed three regions as expected. At 
one point of time the ratio was as high as 0.7. But due to the fact that a user can 
simultaneously set incorrect permission on two or more files in his/her home-directory 
this ratio does not indicate percentages of users of the population having this 
vulnerability. The second region started from day 140 to 538 and is quite stable. Then 
suddenly the value for measure Tv(t) suddenly drops. This huge drop in the number of 
instances for the vulnerability is due to the conjunction of the action of the system 
administrators for removing this vulnerability. The third region was more controlled 
initially but then again the number raised. This important increase over the last phase is 
also difficult to explain. It may be due to new users added to the system who would 
34
implement the similar type of configuration error. We then focused in more details on 
some more specific vulnerabilities. Were all the different vulnerabilities similar in nature 
of their behavior to the aggregate of them? Measure Tv(t) was plotted against time for the 
group members. The main contributors for the total number of instances were the 
vulnerabilities A1, A2, A4, A6, and A7 and showed the similar trends and behavior as the 
group. The instances for the other vulnerabilities in Group A were insignificant in 
number to influence the behavior. Numerically they all were within range of one to five 
instances. But measure Ls,v  was very high for all of them. This shows that these very 
dangerous vulnerabilities were hiding in the system for long before they were taken care 
of. Moreover the estimation for measure Als,v and Ls,v have been nearly equal for them. 
Another strange thing observed was the revival of the vulnerability A11 on day 538. 
When all the vulnerabilities were removed from the system this vulnerability surfaced 
and lasted till the end of the data collection. The average numbers of days the 
vulnerabilities of this group were present for the users were 260 days. The length of days 
for which this vulnerability was present continuously without any break was 209 days. 
Results for Group B
The results in this section detail the number of weak passwords observed during the 21 
months period at LAAS. A password is defined as weak if it would be short or which 
could be rapidly guessed by searching a subset such as words in the dictionary, proper 
names, words based on the user name or common variations on these themes [14]. On the 
other hand, a strong password would be sufficiently long, random, or produceable only 
by the user who chose it. On guessing attacks, it can be said that on an average it will 
require considerably more time than a weak password. There are three variables for a 
password cracker tool that can be set: time for which it is run, the size of the dictionary it 
uses and rules applied on the dictionary words. A weak password is defined with respect 
to these three parameters. For example, given a fixed set of rules and a dictionary a 
password will be considered as weak if it is cracked in less than one hour. For the data 
collection at LAAS-CNRS the definition of a weak password was fixed throughout the 


































Figure 3.7 shows the plot of the measure Tv(t) for weak passwords. Figure 3.8 shows the 
plot for measure Tv(t)/Up(t). Since each user had only one user account this measure also 
represents the percentages of users who had weak passwords. For the first figure we 
observe that there is a sudden jump in the increase of weak passwords on day 283. The 
numbers of weak passwords increase from 107 to 120. This is probably due to the large 
number of new users introduced on that day (around 42) as can be seen in Figure 3.3a. In 
general for Figure 3.7, we can see a steady rise in the number of weak passwords until 
around day 480. Then the number of weak passwords drops significantly. This huge 
decrease is due to an action from the system administrators contacting the users with 
weak password urging them to modify them. Still 8% of the users continued having weak 
passwords.          
         
               Figure 3.7: Tv(t) for Group B                                  
 Figure 3.8: Tv(t)/Up(t) for Group B 
The plots for the measures Ncv(t) and Rcv(t) are shown in the Figure 3.9 and 3.10   






























by the system administrator as mentioned before. The jump in both the graphs around day 
300 is unexplained. One important conclusion driven from these graphs is that both the 
rate of introduction of new weak passwords Nv(t) and rate of removal of weak passwords 
Rv(t) in the system remain constant for different periods. Even after the action of the 
system administrators this observation holds true. The estimation for Nv(t) till day 282 is 
0.41 and becomes 0.40 after day 287. The estimation for Rv(t) for different time periods 
are: 0.28 before day 284, 0.41 from day 285 to day 468 and 0.42 after day 469. The mean 
value estimation for the measure Als   for this group of vulnerabilities was 168 days and 
154 days for Ls.  The last result implies that the mean time for which a user kept his/her 
password weak continuously before making it strong is around 154 days. 
  
                                 Figure 3.9: Ncv(t) for Group B


































Results for Group D
Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 present the plot of measure Tv(t) and Tv(t)/Up(t) for a group 
D vulnerability. In effect the first graph shows the number of files .mailrc that contains a 
vulnerability. The exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to obtain super user 
privileges. Looking at these figures several distinct phases can be identified. The first 
phase until around day 80 corresponds to stable number of vulnerabilities. The second 
phase from day 80 to day 200 witnesses a sharp increase in Tv(t). From day 136 to 144 a 
sharp rise in measure Tv(t) can be seen (from 22 to 42). The users who were impacted 
with this vulnerability during this time remained vulnerable till the end of study. Ls,v is 
over 400 days for these users. From day 200 till day 530 the measure Tv(t) is stable. A 
huge decrease appears around day 530. This decrease is probably due to an action from 
the system administrator to remove this vulnerability. After this decrease, a relatively 
stable phase appears again.
     
 Figure 3.11: Tv(t) for Group D














While the important decrease in the number of vulnerabilities around day 530 is 
explainable, the important increase of around 120 days followed by a long period of 
stability is more difficult to interpret. Similarly the sudden dip observed on day 166 also 
cannot be explained based on the information provided, though the data has been checked 
carefully to confirm this observation. 
Results for Group F
There are four periods that can be observed in the evolution of this vulnerability. For the 
first hundred days, the observed instances of this vulnerability varied from 200 to 231. 
One particularly dangerous observation during this time was that on the 68th day two 
users made their home-directory world writable thus making their directories vulnerable 
to all 700 users present at that time. But on day 102 these two users again assigned 
correct permissions to their home-directories. This was the only time during the study 
that anyone had made their home-directories world writable. After the first 100 days the 
number of this vulnerability kept decreasing and the second distinct period can be seen to 
exist till day 162. The number of vulnerabilities during this period ranged from 175 to 
200, but they were always decreasing. After that stable periods can be seen where 
measure Tv(t) ranged from 127 to 142. Finally system administrator took some action 
around day 536 and this brought down the number to just 14 from 127. 
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                                              Figure 3.14: Tv(t)/Up(t) for Group F
Results for Group G
The measure Tv(t) for this group of vulnerability represents the number of users sharing 
some of their privileges with another user through the .rhosts file. This sharing can be 
seen as a configuration feature or as a vulnerability. Instances of the vulnerability are 
counted for each user added to in the .rhosts file of a different user. Figure 3.15 shows a 
very stable estimation for measure Tv(t). The average estimation for measure Tv(t) is also 
26, very low compared to other groups. Figure 3.16 shows another very stable curve for 
measure Tv(t)/Up(t). The value of measure Tv(t)/Up(t) lies between 0.025 to 0.045, the 
most stable observed among all the groups of vulnerabilities studied. The average of the 
estimation for this measure is .034 but due to the way the vulnerability is being counted 
this estimation does not reflect the percentages of users afflicted by this vulnerability. 
The stability of the two measures discussed above are ascertained by the plots of Nv(t) 
(users adding new users in their .rhosts file) and Rv(t) (users removing other users from 
their .rhosts file). Both of these figures are remarkably similar leading to the stability of 
measure Tv(t)/Up(t) over the period of study. The sudden dip and rise observed on day 
546 was due to the fact that on that day two users removed all the users present on their 




















































Figure 3.15: Tv(t) for Group G
  
 Figure 3.16: Tv(t)/Up(t) for Group G
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Figure 3.18: Rcv(t) for Group G
3.3.4) Conclusions
The measure Tv(t)/Up(t) does not always represent the percentages of users afflicted by a 
particular vulnerability.  It depends on two things: the way instances of vulnerabilities are 
counted and the way the groups are formed. For example, for the .rhosts vulnerability, a 
user can put several users in his/her .rhosts file and each listing is being counted as a 
separate vulnerability. The first group of vulnerabilities (Group A) can be given as 
another example where different files are grouped together for analysis purpose, so a user 
may assign incorrect permissions simultaneously to different files.
The results show that the system for which data was collected was dynamic in nature and 
the action of the system administrator, changing user population drastically affected the 
total instances of the vulnerabilities in the system.  For group A, the trends observed for 
the following files were similar in nature: .login, .emacs, .tcshrc, .xinitrc, .Xdefaults. For 
group B, the most significant result observed was that both the rate of introduction of new 
weak passwords and rate of removal of weak passwords remained constant. For group D, 
it was interesting to see that 20 users had kept the vulnerability related to .mailrc files 
continuously for 400 days showing a total lack of awareness. For group F, the most 
noticeable event observed was that on day 64 two users made their home-directories 
world writable. This in turn made it vulnerable to all the 700 users present on the system 
during that time. Also estimations for measure lack of awareness. For group F, the most 
noticeable event observed was that on day 64 when two users made their home-
directories world writable. This in turn made it vulnerable to all the 700 users present on 
the system during that time. Also estimations for measure Tv(t) and measure Tv(t)/Up(t) 
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consistently decreased throughout the period of data collection. For group G, the 
consistency observed for measure Tv(t) was noticeable. At the end of the data collection 
when the number of vulnerabilities in other groups significantly decreased this 
vulnerability was not affected. After having analyzed the data collected at LAAS-CNRS, 
we now analyze the data collected by Ferret at UIUC.
3.4 Data Analysis: UIUC
3.4.1 Introduction
Ferret has been installed on eight hosts at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign to 
start the process of data collection. Ferret was run periodically as a cron job and data 
have been collected three days a week. Ferret was run in both the modes. But the results 
were not reported to the system administrator. The brief description of the hosts on which 
Ferret is run is listed in Table 3.4. The hosts are chosen as to represent different operating 
systems and versions, including three server-class hosts and three workstations. More 
specifically there are five Sun hosts, two HP-UX hosts and one Linux host. The users 
mainly consisted of researchers and students with strong background in computer science 
3.4.2 Working Methodology
The whole process of data analysis needed to be automated because of the amount of data 
Ferret generates for each host. With Ferret being deployed at more and more places, the 
volume of data sent every week for analysis purpose will be huge. This requires an 
environment to be set up that makes the process of analysis easy, fast and reliable. For 
this purpose scripts were written in Perl DBI (Database Interface) to feed the raw Ferret 
data to a MySql database and query the database. DBI allows writing Perl code that 
accesses data without needing to worry about database or platform specific issues. So the 
output of Ferret can be analyzed in the Windows environment to later take the advantage 
of MS-Excel data processing capabilities. One of the Perl scripts used for transferring the
data to Mysql database is given in Appendix A4. This script is written for the format of 
data furnished when Ferret runs in the second mode.
The steps followed by the script given in Appendix A4 are given below:
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1)  Asks the user to specify the folder where Ferret output data is located.
2) Opens the folder and reads all the output files in an array.
3) Connects to the Mysql database using user name and password of the user.
4) Creates separate table for each corresponding file contained in the output folder.
5) Reads the output files one by one and writes the data to the tables in the desired 
format. Repeats these steps for all the output files.
6) Disconnects the database.
The Mysql table created by the above script contained the following fields:
Table 3.3: Fields in the Mysql Table 
Once the tables are created the next step was to retrieve the information from the table. 
Again the choice was Perl and Perl DBI. A couple of SQL queries were written for the 
purpose. A sample script is given in the Appendix A4. The steps followed by the script 
are given below:
1) Asks the user to specify the database to be queried.
2)  Puts all the vulnerabilities in an array for which query is required to be run.
3)  Prepares and executes the statement to create the result table.
4) Prepares and executes the query and puts the obtained results in the result 
table. 
The result table generated by the above script is then exported to MS-Excel using a tool 
from the Intelligent Converters known as sql2xls.exe. Once the results are on the Excel 
Field                    Type Null Key Default Extra  
Id                  int(11) PRI NULL auto_increment














spreadsheets, VB Macros took over the task of automating various computing tasks 
which included calculating measure Als, plotting the measure Tv(t) as a function of time 
for different vulnerabilities. A sample script for one of the VB Macro is given in 
Appendix A4. This Macro plots measure Tv(t) as a function of time. This Macro is to be 
run in the worksheet containing the result table. The steps followed by this Macro are as 
follows:
1) Positions the chart using column and row height units.
2) Names the chart and sets the type of chart.
3) Adds data series and adds axes.
4) Formats the titles of the axis as desired. 
3.4.3 Results and Observations
The results obtained for data collected at UIUC starting from 17th October 2003 to 27th
June 2004 is discussed in the next paragraph. Table 3.4 lists all the hosts and the total 
number of vulnerabilities and instances. The type of vulnerabilities and the number of 
instances remained constant for the complete duration of studies. All the vulnerabilities 
that were present at the beginning of data collection remained present throughout the 
entire period of data collection. No new vulnerabilities appeared and as a result, the 
estimations for the measures Nv(t) and Rv(t) remained zero throughout the period of data 
collection. The estimations for measure Als,v and Ls,v also could not be given as the 
period of data collection is small. The only non-trivial estimation that can be carried out 
was for the measure Tv(t) and is given in Table 3.5 for different hosts and vulnerabilities 
groups. It can be seen from Table 3.4 that host 1 contained a large number of 
vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities found on this host were predominantly detected by 
first group (non-root-ownership of critical files and directories), fifth group 
(configuration issues in certain files of users’ home-directories) and seventh group 


















           
Figure 3.19: Tv (t) for Fifth group
More specifically, critical directories like /bin, /dev were not owned by root. Many files 
in users’ home-directories had configuration issues. For example, many users had set the 
permission on their .cshrc, .login, .profile, .rhosts, .emacs, .forward, .logout, .tcshrc, 
.xinitrc, .kshrc, .netrc, .screenrc files as group and world writable. The plot for measure 
Tv(t) for this group of vulnerabilities generated using the Macro is shown in Figure 3.19. 
This is the only group of vulnerabilities that showed variation with time. Some of the 
entries in the /etc/group file had blank password fields, contained group names that were 
not alphanumeric. Moreover the file /etc/shadow for this host does not exist. Four users 
had put the permissions on their home-directories as world writable and seventeen users 
had put it group writable.
The rest of the hosts mainly showed vulnerabilities that were also seen on host A. Some 
of the other vulnerabilities were detected by the following Ferret plug-ins: homedir-world 
and group writable, rhosts-username, set-umask-etc-profile. 
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Table 3.4: Hosts and number of Vulnerabilities Found at UIUC
























































1 4 1 175* 70 20 15
2 0 1 9 16 3 4
3 0 0 0 15 0 3
4 0 0 0 0 0 3
5 0 0 0 16 0 4
6 0 0 0 18 0 5
7 0 0 4 15 0 5
8 0 1 12 15 0 2
Table 3.5: Breakdown of Vulnerabilities Found on Various Hosts at UIUC
*Average value provided for this measure
3.4.4 Conclusions 
The results obtained for UIUC data are very stagnant in nature. Moreover the types of 
vulnerabilities present on different hosts are mainly from two or three groups of Ferret 
plug-ins. May be the period of data collection is too short to see the dynamic behavior. 
For example, the users on these hosts may not have changed. 
But still it is interesting to see the number of vulnerabilities on host A. It is a HP-UX 
server host. One explanation behind this observation could be that this host is relatively 
old (about 3.5 years old) compared to the other hosts. Another reason could be the large 
number of users it is serving (i.e. about 335 users). The vulnerabilities found by plug-ins 
focusing on the non-ownership by root of critical files/directories and on vulnerabilities 
in the password files are serious in nature and demand more alertness on the part of the 
system administrator. On the other hand, the significant number of vulnerabilities found 
related to the configuration issues in the home directory files shows negligence on the 
part of users.  The total number of home-directories related vulnerabilities present on host 
A was simply too high. Most of the vulnerabilities found are easily correctable, and a 
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system administrator with a tool such as Ferret can use it to check the hosts quickly (with 
an average time of around 120 seconds) and efficiently on a regular basis. 
3.5 Comparison of the Two Data Analysis 
It is interesting to compare the results obtained at LAAS-CNRS and UIUC. These two 
data collections were carried out for different types of user population. While at UIUC 
the users were mainly with computer science background, at LAAS-CNRS users 
consisted of users with diverse backgrounds. Not only there is a gap of 7 years between 
the two data collection activities but also they are at geographically distant places. The 
system administrators at UIUC corrected some serious vulnerabilities on seeing the first 
results of Ferret. But data collection started only after that phase. As an example, on 
noticing that Ferret output showed some users had blank password field the system 
administrator immediately notified the users and got it corrected. But once the data 
collection started the system administrator was no longer in the loop. For the comparison 
purpose, it should be pointed out that it may not be much significance in comparing the 
absolute values obtained for various measures. For example, it may not be much 
importance in comparing that 15% of users at LAAS had a particular vulnerability while 
only 10% of users were afflicted with the same vulnerability at UIUC. This comparison 
can only be made if there is a significant difference in the percentages of users affected 
by the vulnerability. Moreover because of the nature of the results obtained at UIUC most 
of the measures had their values as zero. So under these circumstances, the main aim of 
comparison can still be to see how measure Tv(t) behaved for the two places. 
The group of vulnerabilities that were common for both the studies are as follows:
a) Both group A of LAAS-CNRS and fifth group of Ferret plug-ins look for 
vulnerabilities resulting due to configuration issues for certain files in users’ home-
directories. Ferret list of plug-ins is more comprehensive so the results obtained at 
UIUC take into account more files. But it can be seen that the results obtained at 
LAAS-CNRS are more dynamic in nature. Whereas there are huge jumps and falls for 
the estimation of measure Tv(t) at LAAS-CNRS, results at UIUC are more stable.
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b)  Group F of LAAS-CNRS and tenth group of Ferret plug-ins look for the same 
purpose of checking if any user has put permission his/her home-directory as world or 
group writable. Whereas at LAAS-CNRS, two users made their home-directories 
world writable, no such event was observed at UIUC. Tv(t) was always decreasing at 
LAAS-CNRS whereas it was a constant function observed at UIUC.
c) Both Group G of LAAS-CNRS and ninth group of Ferret plug-ins look for if a user 
has put anyone in his/her .rhosts file. The evolution of the measure Tv(t) for the two 
data collections was similar. More specifically, at LAAS-CNRS the estimation for 
measure Tv(t) did not show any of the dramatic changes observed for the other 
groups, it was constantly the same  at UIUC for the nine months of data collection. 
The rest of groups were exclusive for both the studies. 
For the common groups it was observed that results from UIUC are very stable in nature 
but LAAS-CNRS results were showing a lot of fluctuations. This result is significant 
though absolute numbers of vulnerabilities found in both the networks may not be of 
much practical importance. However it is interesting to see this difference of nature in the 
results collected at different university environments. The change in the user population 
at UIUC was not that high as observed at LAAS-CNRS. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusions and Future Work
Ferret, the new host vulnerability checking tool described in the first part of this thesis 
can be run in two modes. One mode is designed to be helpful for the system 
administrators and the other for security community. For the system administrators it is a 
tool that saves a lot of manual efforts. According to system administrators’ time and 
resources constraints only a handful of plug-ins can be picked and chosen to run. The 
keywords set that can be given to run a particular plug-in are very comprehensive in 
nature. All the possible variation of the key words that can be used to run plug-ins have 
been included in the plug-ins. For example, a user wanting to check if a particular 
directory or file is set group writable can use both the spellings: writable and writeable as 
keyword. Ferret second mode actually builds privilege graphs [4] that will help security 
community efforts to quantify the computer security [13]. The required information for 
the privilege graphs are collected by the plug-ins module and passed to the core of the 
Ferret. Thus the core of Ferret has the ability and flexibility to adopt for any new mode 
that may be thought in future. 
The plug-ins implemented till now in Ferret have been extensively tested for different 
operating systems and by different people. The team included many system 
administrators whose valuable feedbacks and suggestions have been duly taken care of.  
The code is well documented, clear and precise. This will help people in developing new 
plug-ins and to change the existing ones according to their own requirements. Some of 
the critical parts of the code have been described in the thesis. The clarity of the code 
brings a confidence among the system administrator that the tool is not doing anything 
other than the intended purpose. The core and the plug-ins along with the configuration 
files in the tool have been tested not to use any command that delete a file or kills a 
process. Plug-ins developed till now mainly target Linux, Solaris, and HP-UX 
requirements. The security community is expected to participate in developing new plug-
ins modules for multiple operating systems. Since Ferret project has been implemented in 
Perl there should be no problem for anyone to develop plug-ins modules targeting 
vulnerabilities in Windows also. 
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The second part of the thesis showed how a set up has been developed to automatically 
process the data collected by Ferret. The type of data collected by Ferret is rare. And will 
definitely help the security community towards the quantification of security. The type of 
analysis of host vulnerabilities is unique. Some more measures may need to be defined to 
capture the effects of various influences and factors on the measures. These measures are 
not only time dependent but depend on a lot of other factors. After comprehensive studies 
only distribution curves of various vulnerabilities will be obtained. One of the very 
interesting results for LAAS-CNRS data seen that was observed was that both the rate of 
introduction and rate of removal of weak passwords in a system was constant and not 
depended on time. More studies need to be conducted in these efforts before generalizing 
this but it is certainly an interesting result for the evolution of this vulnerability. For 
LAAS-CNRS the estimation for the measures Als, and Ls have been very high. It may be 
really a worrisome result for system administrator to see that an average user keeps 
his/her password weak continuously for 154 days before making it strong and for 40 days 
continuously two users had kept their home-directory world writable. Overall the results 
obtained at LAAS-CNRS were marked by huge jumps and falls in sharp contrast of what 
is observed at UIUC. The results obtained for UIUC showed a consistent behavior and 
less percentages of users were found vulnerable to attacks for the vulnerabilities checked. 
This result is also very significant in itself. The exact reasons behind these differences 
still need to be investigated and more data need to be collected over diverse population 
and environments.  This will lead to finding out what types of possible behavior are there 
and what set one user population in a particular environment different from the other. In 
this way studies discussed in this thesis may be considered as at initial stages. The 
measure Tv(t) need to be normalized not only with respect to number of users in the 
population but also with other factors. This will make the measure independent of various 
parameters on which it depend which will allow data to be compared across different 
networks and for diverse population. The curves representing the distribution of 
vulnerabilities for different variables need to be obtained. It is hoped that these results 
will motivate people to share data on computer security.
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Appendixes 
These appendixes provide code for the Ferret core and vulnerability checking plug-ins, 
graphs for the data analysis conducted on the LAAS-CNRS data, and code written for 
automating the data analysis process for data collected using Ferret.
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Appendix A.1: Source code of Ferret Core
The source code of Ferret core is given below
eval '(exit $?0)' && eval 'exec perl -S $0 ${1+"$@"}'
   & eval 'exec perl -S $0 $argv:q'
   if 0;
#Copyright 2002, 2003, 2004, University of Maryland and University of 
#Illinois.  All rights reserved.
#Developed by: Jason Martin, Anil Sharma, Nitin Anand, Michel Cukier,
#William H. Sanders
#University of Maryland and University of Illinois
#URL: http://Ferret.crhc.uiuc.edu
#Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
#copy of this software and associated documentation files (the Software),
#to deal with the Software without restriction, including without 
#limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute,
#sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons 
#to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following
#conditions:
# * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
#notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimers.
# * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
#notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimers in the
#documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
# * Neither the names of University of Maryland or University of 
#Illinois, nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse or 
#promote products derived from this Software without specific prior 
#written permission.
#THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS 
#OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF 
#MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
#IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR 
#ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, 
#TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE 































# Include the configuration file.
require "Ferret.conf";
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
GetOptions("verbose" => \$verbose, 
           "help" => sub { printuseage; exit(0) } , 
           "list" => \$list, 
           "longdesc" => \$long_desc, 
           "privgain" => \$priv_gain, 
           "plugindir=s" => \$plugin_dir, 
           "output=s" => \$output_plugin, 
           "useos=s" => \$useos,
           "useosversion=s" => \$useos_version,  
           "mode=s" => \$mode);
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Enforce running as root, as most plugins will fail if not root.
if($< != 0)
{
   print "ERROR: This program must be run as root (UID 0)\n";
   printuseage;
   exit (-1);
}
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Keyword to run from command line argument
my @runwords = @ARGV;
my $argc = scalar @ARGV;
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
print "Starting Ferret Security Auditing System\n";
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------




   print "INFO: Using default \"all\" keywords\n";
   @runwords = ("all");
}
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
my $hostname = hostname();
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chomp $hostname;
my $osname = `uname -s`;
chomp $osname;
my $osversion = `uname -r`;
chomp $osversion;
my $date = `date '+%a %-d %b %Y'`;
chomp $date;
my $time = `date '+%-I :%M %p'` ;
chomp $time;
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------




   print "Setting OS to $useos\n";




   $useos = $osname;
   #if user does not specify anything then it takes from command "uname -s"









   $useos_version = $osversion;
}
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
vprint "Using plug-in directory \"$plugin_dir\"\n";
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Get list of plugins from Plugins directory and store in an array to be used
# afterwards
opendir (PLUGS, $plugin_dir) || die "ERROR: Couldn't open plug-in directory \"$plugin_dir\"\n";
my @plugin_list = grep m/.*\.plugin$/, readdir(PLUGS);
closedir PLUGS;
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------







# declaring counter variables ($i, $j, $k, $l) 
my $i = 0;










   @users_array = @{$name};
   $user_name_array[$i] = $users_array[0];
   $group_id_etc_passwd[$i] = $users_array[3];




   @groups_array = @{$name};
   $group_name_array[$j] = $groups_array[0];
   $group_id_etc_group[$j] = $groups_array[2];























   $def_version = 0;
   $def_keywords = 0;
   $def_oslist = 0;
   $def_short_desc = 0;
   $def_long_desc = 0;
   $def_priv_gain = 0;
   $plugin= $plugin_list[$i];
   $plugin =~ s/(.*)\.plugin$/\1/;
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   open FILE, "$plugin_dir/$plugin.plugin --info 2>&1 |" || die "ERROR: Couldn't run plug-in 
\"$plugin\"\n";
   INFOLOOP: while($line = <FILE>)
   {       
      @words = split (/\s+/, $line);
      $word = shift (@words);
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
      if($word =~ m/VERSION/)
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      {
         $plugins{$plugin}{VERSION} = shift (@words);
         vprint "Version number of $plugin: $plugins{$plugin}{VERSION}\n";
         $def_version = 1;
         next INFOLOOP;
      }
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
      if($word =~ m/KEYWORDS/)
      {
         $plugins{$plugin}{KEYWORDS} = join (' ', @words);
         vprint "Keywords for $plugin: $plugins{$plugin}{KEYWORDS}\n";
         # Build a hash with keywords from the plugins for keys and
         # the names of the plugins as values, only if this plug-in
         # is for this operating system
         while ($word = shift(@words))
         {
            push (@{$keywords{$word}}, $plugin);
         }
         push (@{$keywords{"all"}}, $plugin);
         $def_keywords = 1;
         next INFOLOOP;
      }
#--------------------------------------------------------------------------
     if($word =~ m/OSLIST/)
     {
        $plugins{$plugin}{OSLIST} = join (' ', @words);
        vprint "Operating system list for $plugin: $plugins{$plugin}{OSLIST}\n";
        $def_oslist = 1;
        
        if($plugins{$plugin}{OSLIST} =~ m/$useos/)
        {
           $plugins{$plugin}{ACTIVE} = 1;
        }
        next INFOLOOP;
     }
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
     if($word =~ m/SHORTDESC/)
     {
        $plugins{$plugin}{SHORTDESC} = join (' ', @words);
        vprint "Short description of $plugin: $plugins{$plugin}{SHORTDESC}\n";
        $def_short_desc = 1;
        next INFOLOOP;
     }
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
     if($word =~ m/LONGDESC/)
     {
        $plugins{$plugin}{LONGDESC} = join (' ', @words);
        vprint "Long description of $plugin: $plugins{$plugin}{LONGDESC}\n";
        $def_long_desc = 1;
        next INFOLOOP;
     }
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
     if($word =~ m/PRIVGAIN/)
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     {
        $plugins{$plugin}{PRIVGAIN} = join (' ', @words);
        vprint "Privilege gain of $plugin: $plugins{$plugin}{PRIVGAIN}\n";
        $def_priv_gain = 1;
        next INFOLOOP;
     }
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
   if($word =~ m/^M/)
     {
      print "hello i m caught here \n";
     }
   }
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   if(!$def_version)
   {
      print "WARNING: No version defined for plug-in $plugin\n";
      print "         Using default value of 1.0\n";
      $plugins{$plugin}{VERSION} = "1.0";
   }
   if(!$def_keywords)
   {
      print "WARNING: No keywords defined for plug-in $plugin\n";
      print "         Using default value of \"all\"\n";
      # Don't actually need to assign it to all, as it is by default
   }
   if(!$def_oslist)
   {
      print "WARNING: No operating system list for plug-in $plugin\n";
      print "         Using default value of \"Linux\"\n";
      $plugins{$plugin}{OSLIST} = "Linux";
   }
   if(!$def_short_desc)
   {
      print "WARNING: No short description supplied for plug-in $plugin\n";
      print "         Using default value of \"No description\"\n";
      $plugins{$plugin}{SHORTDESC} = "No description";
   }
   if(!$def_long_desc)
   {
      print "WARNING: No long description supplied for plug-in $plugin\n";
      print "         Using default value of \"No description\"\n";
      $plugins{$plugin}{LONGDESC} = "No description";
   }
   if(!$def_priv_gain)
   {
      print "WARNING: No privilege gain supplied for plug-in $plugin\n";
      print "         Using default value of \"No description\"\n";
      $plugins{$plugin}{PRIVGAIN} = "No description";






   $plugin =~ s/(.*)\.plugin$/\1/;
}
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Remember @runwords?  We got it from the command line argument.
# Use that to get the list of plugins we'll run out of the keywords hash
# we just built
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------






   if(!$keywords{$runword})
   {
      print "WARNING: No plug-ins match keyword \"$runword\"\n";
   }
   else
   {
      # Get a list of the plugins that match the keywords
      push (@runlist, @{$keywords{$runword}});
   }
}




   $plugin =~ s/(.*)\.plugin$/\1/;
   if($plugins{$plugin}{ACTIVE} == 1)
   {
      push(@runlist_active,$plugin);
   }
}
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# If we just wanted to list the plug-ins, do that (with descriptions)




   if(scalar @runlist_active >= 1)
   {
      print "Plugins available:\n";
      foreach $plugin (@runlist_active)
      {
         $plugin =~ s/(.*)\.plugin$/\1/;
         print "$plugin\n";
         print "  $plugins{$plugin}{SHORTDESC}\n";
      }
   }






   if(scalar @runlist_active >= 1)
   {
      print "Plugins available:\n";
      foreach $plugin (@runlist_active)
      {
         $plugin =~ s/(.*)\.plugin$/\1/;
         print "$plugin\n";
         print "  $plugins{$plugin}{LONGDESC}\n";
      }
   }





   if(scalar @runlist_active >= 1)
   {
      print "Plugins available:\n";
      foreach $plugin (@runlist_active)
      {
         $plugin =~ s/(.*)\.plugin$/\1/;
         print "$plugin\n";
         print "  $plugins{$plugin}{SHORTDESC}\n";
         print "  $plugins{$plugin}{PRIVGAIN}\n";
      }
   }
   exit(0);
}
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
vprint "Plug-in list to run: @runlist_active\n"; 
# Run the selected plugins and save the output in another hash
my %result;
my $num_vuln = 0;
my $endtime = 0;
my $elapsed = 0;















   print "Listing Users and Groups\n";
   for($k = 0; $k <= $#group_id_etc_passwd; $k++)
   {
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      for($l = 0;$l <= $#group_id_etc_group;$l++)
      {
         if($group_id_etc_passwd[$k] ==  $group_id_etc_group[$l])
         {
            print "USER $user_name_array[$k] , GROUP $group_name_array[$l] \n";
         }
      }    
   }
   print "\n\n";
}
# Run the Plugins and collect the information from the plugins "output" array
for($j=0; $j <= $max_runlist; $j++)
{
   # All the plugins will be run from here. The runlist was obtained by either
   # using keywords from the user or by default. All the plugins will be run.
   $plugin = $runlist_active[$j];
   vprint "Running $plugin_dir/$plugin\n";
   $plugins{$plugin}{TIMESTAMP} = time;
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   open RUN, "$plugin_dir/$plugin.plugin 2>&1|" || die "Error could nt open for run 
$plugin_dir/$plugin.plugin\n";
   @{$plugins{$plugin}{OUTPUT}} = <RUN>;
   chomp @{$plugins{$plugin}{OUTPUT}};
   close RUN;
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------    
   $endtime = time;
   $elapsed = ($endtime - $plugins{$plugin}{TIMESTAMP});
   $totaltime = $totaltime + $elapsed;
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------




# From the output obtained by the plugins divide the plugins into two
# families: Plugins having found vulnerabilities and those plugins which
# could not found any vulnerability
for($j=0; $j <= $max_runlist; $j++)
{
   $plugin = $runlist_active[$j];
   my $line;
   foreach $line(@{$plugins{$plugin}{OUTPUT}})
   {
      if($line =~ m/RESULT/)
      {
         $line =~ s/RESULT//;
         $result{$plugin}{RESULT} = $line;
         chomp($result{$plugin}{RESULT}); 
         if(($result{$plugin}{RESULT}) =~m/No Vulnerability Found$/)
         {
            push(@non_vul_plugins,$plugin);
         }
         else
         {
            push(@vul_plugins,$plugin);
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            $num_vuln = $num_vuln +1;
         }
      }
   }
}
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The plugins having found vulnerabilites are calling the output plugin from
# here in the mode chosen by the user




my $counter_var = 0;
for($counter_var=0;$counter_var<=$max_vul_plugins;$counter_var++)
{
   my $vul_plugin;
   $vul_plugin = $vul_plugins[$counter_var];
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   # Plugins having found the vulnerabilites are now calling the output plugin
   # in the first mode
   if($mode !~ /pvg/)
   {   
      open OUTPUT, "|$output_plugin_dir/$output_plugin" || die "could not open up the output plugin 
'$output_plugin_dir/$output_plugin' \n";
      print OUTPUT "LIST PLUGINNAME $vul_plugin\n";
      print OUTPUT "DESCRIPTION $plugins{$vul_plugin}{SHORTDESC}\n";
      print OUTPUT "RESULT $result{$vul_plugin}{RESULT}\n";
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
      # The output from the individual plugins are printed from here.
      my $line;
      my @output_array ="";
      foreach $line (@{$plugins{$vul_plugin}{OUTPUT}})
      {
         chomp($line);
         if($line =~ m/^(VUL|NOT_EXIST)/)
         {
            $line =~ s/VUL//g;
            $line =~ s/NOT_EXIST/ /g;
            push(@output_array, "$line:");
         }
      }   
      my $max_output_array = $#output_array;
      $output_array[$max_output_array] =~ s/://;
      print OUTPUT "OUTPUT @output_array\n";
      print OUTPUT "\nEND\n";
      close OUTPUT;
   }
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   # Plugins having found the vulnerabilites are now calling the output plugin
   # in the second mode
  if($mode =~ /pvg/)
   {
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      open OUTPUT, "|$output_plugin_dir/$output_plugin" || die "could not open up the output plugin 
'$output_plugin_dir/$output_plugin'\n";
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
      # The output from the individual plugins are printed from here.
      my @pvginfo;
      my $line;
      foreach $line (@{$plugins{$vul_plugin}{OUTPUT}})
      {
         chomp($line);
         if($line =~ m/^NOT_EXIST/)
         {
            $line =~ s/NOT_EXIST//g;
            print OUTPUT "NOFILE $vul_plugin, $line\n";
         }
      }
      foreach $line (@{$plugins{$vul_plugin}{OUTPUT}})
      {
         chomp($line);
         if($line =~ m/^PRIV/)
         {
            $line =~ s/PRIV//g; 
            print OUTPUT "PRIVGAIN $vul_plugin, $line\n\n";
         }
      }   
      close OUTPUT;
   }
}
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Those plugins which could not find any vulnerability are calling the
# output plugin from here in the mode chosen by the user
print "\nPlugins not finding any vulnerability are:\n";
my $max_non_vul_plugins=0;
$max_non_vul_plugins = $#non_vul_plugins;
vprint "max_nonvul_plugins: $max_non_vul_plugins\n";   
for($counter_var=0;$counter_var<= $max_non_vul_plugins;$counter_var++)
{
   my $non_vul_plugin;
   $non_vul_plugin = $non_vul_plugins[$counter_var];
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   # Plugins not having found vulnerabilites are now calling the output plugin
   # in the first mode
   if($mode !~ /pvg/)
   {   
      open OUTPUT, "|$output_plugin_dir/$output_plugin" || die "could not open up the output plugin 
'$output_plugin_dir/$output_plugin' \n";
      print OUTPUT "NON_VUL PLUGINNAME $non_vul_plugin\n";
      print OUTPUT "DESCRIPTION $plugins{$non_vul_plugin}{SHORTDESC}\n";
      print OUTPUT "RESULT $result{$non_vul_plugin}{RESULT}\n";
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
      # The output from the individual plugins are printed from here.
      my $line;
      my @output_array ="";
      foreach $line (@{$plugins{$non_vul_plugin}{OUTPUT}})
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      {
         chomp($line);
         if($line =~ m/^(VUL|NOT_EXIST)/)
         {
            $line =~ s/VUL//g;
            $line =~ s/NOT_EXIST//g;
            push(@output_array, "$line:");
         }
      }   
      my $max_output_array = $#output_array;
      $output_array[$max_output_array] =~ s/://;
      print OUTPUT "OUTPUT @output_array\n";
      print OUTPUT "END\n";
      close OUTPUT;
   }
#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   # Plugins not having found vulnerabilites are now calling the output plugin
   # in the second mode
   if($mode =~ /pvg/)
   {
      open OUTPUT, "|$output_plugin_dir/$output_plugin" || die "could not open up the output plugin 
'$output_plugin_dir/$output_plugin' \n";
      print OUTPUT "NON_VUL $non_vul_plugin\n";
   }
   close OUTPUT;
}
print "$num_vuln vulnerabilities found in $totaltime seconds\n";
########################################################################
# End of main program
########################################################################
# Print out the useage information.  Note that this does not
# end the program, should you want to do something AFTER
# printing the useage.
sub printuseage
{
   print "Useage: Ferret [options] [keyword [keyword ...]]\n";
   print "--mode         :\t This argument can be set to 'vul' or 'pvg'. 
                           By default, the arguement is set to 'vul'. 
                           With 'vul' Ferret lists all the 
                           vulnerabilities found. With 'pvg' Ferret 
                           lists all the vulnerabilities found and the 
                           associated privilege gains.\n";
   print "--list         :\t This argument lists all the vulnerability 
   checking plugins with their short 
   descriptions.\n";
   print "--longdesc     :\t This arguement lists all the vulnerability 
                           checking plugins with their long descriptions.\n";
   print "--privgain     :\t This argument lists all the vulnerability 
   checking plugins with the possible privilege 
                           changes if the vulnerabilities found by those 
                           plugins are exploited.\n";
   print "--output       :\t This arguement sets the output plugin to be 
                           used.By default the arguement is set to 
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                           'outputplugin_common_ascii'.\n";
   print "--help         :\t This arguement lists the help options.\n";
   print "--useos        :\t This arguement sets the system OS name to 
                           that specified by the user.\n";
   print "--useosversion :\t This arguement sets the system OS version 
                           to that specified by the user.\n";
   print "keywordlist    :\t This arguement specify keywords to 
                           run Ferret.\n";
   print "                \t Note that the keywords must be after all 
                           optional arguments.\n";
}
# Print out additional information, if verbose mode is turned on but 
#take care to see in which mode Ferret is running and so display relevant 
#information to that type only 
sub vprint
{
   if($verbose)
   {
      print @_;
   }
}
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Appendix A.2: Source code of Vulnerability Checking Plug-ins
The source code for some of the vulnerability checking plug-ins from different plug-ins 
families are given below
1. bin-root-ownership.plugin
eval '(exit $?0)' && eval 'exec perl -S $0 ${1+"$@"}'
   & eval 'exec perl -S $0 $argv:q'
   if 0;
#Copyright 2002, 2003, 2004, University of Maryland and University of 
#Illinois.  All rights reserved.
#Developed by: Jason Martin, Anil Sharma, Nitin Anand, Michel Cukier,
#William H. Sanders
#University of Maryland and University of Illinois
#URL: http://Ferret.crhc.uiuc.edu
#Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
#copy of this software and associated documentation files (the Software),
#to deal with the Software without restriction, including without 
#limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute,
#sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons 
#to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following
#conditions:
# * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
#notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimers.
# * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
#notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimers in the
#documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
# * Neither the names of University of Maryland or University of 
#Illinois, nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse or 
#promote products derived from this Software without specific prior 
#written permission.
#THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS 
#OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF 
#MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
#IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR 
#ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, 
#TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE 






my @plugin_info = (
"VERSION 0.1\n",
"KEYWORDS files directory  owner ownership root\n",
"OSLIST Linux SunOS HP-UX\n",
"SHORTDESC Checks whether root owns or not the critical /bin directory \n",
"LONGDESC This plug-in checks whether the critical system directory /bin is owned by root\n",
"PRIVGAIN No privilege change,/bin,not owned by root\n"
);
GetOptions("info" => sub { print @plugin_info; exit(0); });
my @output;
my $user;
my $vulnerability_found = 0;
my $chk_dir;
$chk_dir ='/bin';
if (! -e $chk_dir)
{
   push @output,"NOT_EXIST Directory /bin does not exist\n"; 
   push @output,"RESULT No Vulnerability Found\n";
   print @output;
   die "Directory /bin does not exist\n";
}
my ($dev, $ino, $mode, $nlink, $uid, $gid, $rdev, $size, $atime, $mtime, $ctime, $blksize, $blocks) = stat 
"$chk_dir";
  
if( $uid ne 0)
{
   $vulnerability_found = 1;
}
push @output,"VUL None\n";
if ($vulnerability_found == 1)
{




   push @output,"RESULT No Vulnerability Found\n";
} 
push @output,"PRIV No privilege change,/bin,not owned by root\n";
print @output;
2. check-access-exports.plugin
eval '(exit $?0)' && eval 'exec perl -S $0 ${1+"$@"}'
   & eval 'exec perl -S $0 $argv:q'
   if 0;
#Copyright 2002, 2003, 2004, University of Maryland and University of 
#Illinois.  All rights reserved.
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#Developed by: Jason Martin, Anil Sharma, Nitin Anand, Michel Cukier,
#William H. Sanders
#University of Maryland and University of Illinois
#URL: http://Ferret.crhc.uiuc.edu
#Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
#copy of this software and associated documentation files (the Software),
#to deal with the Software without restriction, including without 
#limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute,
#sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons 
#to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following
#conditions:
# * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
#notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimers.
# * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
#notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimers in the
#documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
# * Neither the names of University of Maryland or University of 
#Illinois, nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse or 
#promote products derived from this Software without specific prior 
#written permission.
#THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS 
#OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF 
#MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
#IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR 
#ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, 
#TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE 





my @plugin_info = (
"VERSION 0.1\n",
"KEYWORDS explicit access control /etc/exports\n",
"OSLIST Linux \n",
"SHORTDESC Checks for files in /exports that have been given some access control or not.\n",
"LONGDESC This plug-in checks for files in /exports have been given some access control or not and", 
" if there is no explicit access control then it shows a warning\n", 
"PRIVGAIN No privilege change, /etc/exports,access not specified\n"
);
GetOptions("info" => sub { print @plugin_info; exit(0); }),
my @array;   









   push @output,"NOT_EXIST File $chk_file does not exist\n";  
   push @output,"RESULT No Vulnerability Found\n";
   print @output;
   die "File $chk_file does not exist\n";
}
open(EXPORTS, "/etc/exports") || die "could not open file /etc/exports\n";
while (($line=<EXPORTS>) ne "")
{
   $match_line = "";
   $match_line = $line;
   @array = split(/\s+/,$match_line);
   my $max_array = $#array;
   if ($max_array > 1)
   {        
      $vulnerability_found =1;




   push @output,"VUL None\n";




   push @output,"VUL None\n";
   push @output,"RESULT No Vulnerability Found\n";
}
push @output, "PRIV No privilege change,/etc/exports,access not specified\n";
print @output;
3. check-path-cshrc.plugin
eval '(exit $?0)' && eval 'exec perl -S $0 ${1+"$@"}'
   & eval 'exec perl -S $0 $argv:q'
   if 0;
#Copyright 2002, 2003, 2004, University of Maryland and University of 
#Illinois.  All rights reserved.
#Developed by: Jason Martin, Anil Sharma, Nitin Anand, Michel Cukier,
#William H. Sanders
#University of Maryland and University of Illinois
#URL: http://Ferret.crhc.uiuc.edu
#Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
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#copy of this software and associated documentation files (the Software),
#to deal with the Software without restriction, including without 
#limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute,
#sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons 
#to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following
#conditions:
# * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
#notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimers.
# * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
#notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimers in the
#documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
# * Neither the names of University of Maryland or University of 
#Illinois, nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse or 
#promote products derived from this Software without specific prior 
#written permission.
#THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS 
#OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF 
#MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
#IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR 
#ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, 
#TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE 








my @plugin_info = (
"VERSION 0.1\n",
"KEYWORDS paths world writeable writable startup file files\n",
"OSLIST Linux SunOS HP-UX\n",
"SHORTDESC Checks for paths inside /.cshrc for world writability\n",
"LONGDESC This plug-in checks pathnames inside root's startup file /.cshrc for world writability\n",
"PRIVGAIN No privilege change,/.cshrc,path inside /.cshrc world writable\n"
);
GetOptions("info" => sub { print @plugin_info; exit(0); });










if (! -e "/.cshrc")
{
   push @output,"NOT_EXIST File /.cshrc does not exist\n";    
   push @output,"RESULT No Vulnerability Found\n";
   print @output;
   die "File /.cshrc does not exist\n";
}
  




    $match_line = "";
    $match_line = $line;
    if ($line =~ /^set/)
    {
       @path = split(/\s+/,$line);




my $max_path = $#path;
my $i=0;
  
for($i=4;$i <= $max_path; $i++)
{
   my ($dev, $ino, $mode, $nlink, $uid, $gid, $rdev, $size, $atime, $mtime,$ctime, $blksize, $blocks) =stat 
"/$path[$i]";
   $actual_mode = sprintf "%04o", $mode & 07777;
   if (($mode & 00002))
   {
      push @output, "VUL $path[$i] is world writable (mode $actual_mode):\n";
      push(@vul_paths,"$path[$i]");
      $vulnerability_found =1;









   push @output,"RESULT None\n";








Appendix A.3: Source code of Output Plug-in
The code for the output plug-in is given below
eval '(exit $?0)' && eval 'exec perl -S $0 ${1+"$@"}'
    & eval 'exec perl -S $0 $argv:q'
    if 0;
#Copyright 2002, 2003, 2004, University of Maryland and University of 
#Illinois.  All rights reserved.
#Developed by: Jason Martin, Anil Sharma, Nitin Anand, Michel Cukier,
#William H. Sanders
#University of Maryland and University of Illinois
#URL: http://Ferret.crhc.uiuc.edu
#Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
#copy of this software and associated documentation files (the Software),
#to deal with the Software without restriction, including without 
#limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute,
#sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons 
#to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following
#conditions:
# * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
#notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimers.
# * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
#notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimers in the
#documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
# * Neither the names of University of Maryland or University of 
#Illinois, nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse or 
#promote products derived from this Software without specific prior 
#written permission.
#THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS 
#OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF 
#MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
#IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR 
#ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, 
#TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE 








while(($matchline = <STDIN>) ne "")
{
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   chomp($matchline); 
   if($matchline =~ m/^LIST/)
   {
      $matchline =~ s/LIST //; 
      print "$matchline\n";
   }
   if($matchline =~ m/^RESULT/)
   {
      print "$matchline\n";
   }
   if($matchline =~ m/^DESCRIPTION/)
   {
      print "$matchline\n";
   }
   if($matchline =~ m/^OUTPUT/)
   {
      print "$matchline\n";
   }
   if($matchline =~ m/^NOFILE/)
   {
      $matchline =~ s/NOFILE//;
      print "$matchline\n";
   }
   if($matchline =~ m/^PRIVGAIN/)
   {
      $matchline =~ s/PRIVGAIN//;
      print "$matchline\n";
   }
   if($matchline =~m/^NON_VUL/)
   {
      $matchline =~ s/NON_VUL //;
      print "$matchline\n";
   }
   if($matchline =~ m/^END/)
   {
      $matchline =~ s/END//;
      print "$matchline\n";



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B.6: Users Related Charts
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Appendix C.1: Perl Script To Transfer Output Data to Mysql Database








my $i;  #counter variable to be used in for loop
print "Welcome this script will enable You to transfer the data from Ferret text files to Your mysql 
database\n\n\n";




opendir(INPUT,"$Ferret_folder") || die "could n't open up the directory!";
@the_files = readdir(INPUT);   








# Connect To Database and create the tables for each corresponding output file 
#########################
my $database;
print "hello please enter the name of the database you want to use\n";
$database = <STDIN>;
chomp($database);
my $hostname = "localhost";
my $username = "xxx";
my $password = "yyy";
my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:mysql:$database:$hostname", $username, $password) or die "Can't 
connect to database: ", $DBI::errstr,"\n";
print "Connected to $database first time... \n";
#tables are automatically named here. the year can be changed 
my $year ='Tab_2004_';
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for($i=0; $i <=$max; $i++)
{
    my $sql = $dbh->prepare('create table '.$year.$i.' 
(   
id int(11) auto_increment not null, 
 PRIMARY KEY (id),
  plugin_name varchar(40) , 
  change_in_privilege varchar(40),  
  file_affected varchar(40),     
                 description varchar(40),
   timestamp varchar(40) 
)
                                     ');
$sql->execute or die "cant execute SQL statement:", $sql->errstr(), "\n";
    }









my $flag = 0;
$file = $the_files[$i];
my @infield = "";
my $infield;
my $line = "";









$new_date[2] = $date[6] - 2000;
$infield = $new_date[0]."-".$new_date[1]."-".$new_date[2];
}









if($flag == 1) 
{








my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:mysql:$database:$hostname", $username, $password);
die "Cannot log into database.  Please try again later.\n" unless $dbh;
my $insertid = $dbh->{mysql_insertid}; 
# Insert values into appropriate table
my $sth = $dbh->prepare("insert into $arr[$i](id, plugin_name, change_in_privilege, file_affected , 
description, timestamp) values ('$insertid','$infield[0]','$infield[1]','$infield[2]','$infield[3]','$infield') 
") or die "can't prepare SQL statement:", $dbh->errstr(), "\n";





}#END OF WHILE LOOP
close INPUT;
}#END OF FOR LOOP
exit(0); 
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Appendix C.2: Perl Script to Query Mysql Database








      my $hostname = "localhost";
      my $username = "anil";
      my $password = "";
      my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:mysql:$database:$hostname", $username, $password) or die  
     "Can't connect to database: ", $DBI::errstr,"\n";
      #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      #get all the tables of the database in an array to be used later  
      my @tables = $dbh->tables();
      #-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      my @array =("bin-root-ownership","dev-root-ownership","etc-passwd-root-ownership",
      "etc-root-ownership","etc-world-writable","group-all-field","group-alphanumeric",
      "group-blank-line","group-gid-blank","group-gid-numeric","group-passwd-blank",
      "group-passwd-char","homedir-group","homedirs-.bashrc-group-writable",
"homedirs-.bashrc-world-writable","homedirs-.cshrc-group-writable","homedirs-.cshrc-world-     
writable");
      
      my $max_array = $#array;
      #---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
my $results ='results_2004_';
for($i=0; $i <=$max_array; $i++)
{
 my $sql = $dbh->prepare('create table '.$results.$i.'
      (   
       plugin_name varchar(40),
       timestamp varchar(40),
       count int
 )
                 ');




my @tables_two = $dbh->tables();






for(my $j = 0; $j <=$max_array;$j++)
{
for($i = 1; $i <=$#tables; $i++)
{
    my $sth = $dbh->prepare("INSERT INTO $array_tables_three[$j] 
SELECT  plugin_name, timestamp, count(plugin_name) 
 FROM $tables[$i] where plugin_name = ' $array[$j] ' GROUP BY timestamp") or die "can't 
prepare SQL statement:", $dbh->errstr(), "\n";







Appendix C.3: Macro to Plot Graphs in MS-Excel
This Macro plots the graph in MS-Excel
Sub Macro_Plot()
Dim co As ChartObject
Dim cw As Long, rh As Long
'Get data for positioning the chart
cw = Columns(1).Width
rh = Rows(1).Height
'Position the chart using column and row height units
Set co = ActiveSheet.ChartObjects.Add(cw * 3, rh * 0.5, cw * 8, rh * 20)
'Name the chart










  .HasAxis(xlCategory, xlPrimary) = True
  .HasAxis(xlCategory, xlSecondary) = False
  .HasAxis(xlValue, xlPrimary) = True




 .HasTitle = True
 .AxisTitle.Caption = "DAYS"
 .AxisTitle.Border.Weight = xlMedium
End With




.Caption = "Tv(t) "
.Font.Size = 10
.Orientation = xlHorizontal







    xlTickLabelPositionNextToAxis










    .Caption = "home-directories related vulnerabilities on host A "
    .Font.Size = "7"
    .Characters.Font.FontStyle = "Bold"
End With
'''''''''''''''''''
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